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Balancing Security and Performance Properties During System Architectural Design

2011· book-chapter· en· W2502915158 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueIGI Global eBooks · 2011
Typebook-chapter
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicSoftware System Performance and Reliability
Canadian institutionsCarleton University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceRotation formalisms in three dimensionsRisk analysis (engineering)Quality (philosophy)Process (computing)Context (archaeology)Process managementComputer securitySystems engineeringSoftware engineeringEngineeringBusiness

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Developers of critical systems need to address several quality properties, such as security and performance, in the early stages of the development cycle to ensure that the system under construction meets its requirements. Sometimes quality properties conflict with each other and/or with the system’s functionalities, so the developers need to make trade-off decisions. Unreasonable costs, added developer resources and tight project schedules may be other reasons for having to trade-off between alternative solutions. In the context of Model-Driven Development, the analysis of quality properties is done by transforming software design models into different analysis models based on various formalisms, which are then analyzed with existing tools. A major challenge is to integrate different models, transformations and tools into a consistent and coherent process. In this chapter the authors present a methodology called Aspect-Oriented Risk Driven Development (AORDD), which integrates the analysis of two quality properties, namely security and performance, into the development process of critical systems. Each quality property is analyzed separately, and then all results are input to a trade-off analysis that identifies conflicts between the properties. Trade-off analysis aims at supporting designers and developers in choosing the security and performance solutions that best fit their needs, without introducing unacceptable development delays or costs. The security analysis consists of identifying the assets (critical components, such as sensitive information) of an application and the attacks that can compromise these assets, and formally analyzing whether these attacks are actually possible using the tools UML2Alloy and Alloy Analyzer. If the system is vulnerable to the attack, some security solution, modeled as an aspect according to Aspect Oriented Modeling (AOM), is added to the system. The analysis must be repeated to ensure that the resulting system is secure. Performance analysis is accomplished using Layered Queuing Network (LQN) models. Annotated system models are transformed into LQN models and performance experiments are executed on them. If the performance results are unacceptable, the system design has to be changed and the analysis repeated. Finally, the results of the security and performance analysis are input to the system quality property trade-off analysis, which is implemented as a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) topology, and which also takes as input external parameters, such as time to market and budget constraints. The results of the trade-off analysis help identify how well a particular design meets performance, security and other project goals, which, in turn, can guide the developer in making informed design decisions. The approach is illustrated using a transactional web e-commerce benchmark (TPC-W) originally developed by the Transaction Processing Performance Council.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.793
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.018
GPT teacher head0.191
Teacher spread0.173 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it