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Record W2560800565 · doi:10.14778/3137628.3137635

Revenue maximization in incentivized social advertising

2017· article· en· W2560800565 on OpenAlexaff
Çiğdem Aslay, Francesco Bonchi, Laks V. S. Lakshmanan, Wei Lu

Bibliographic record

VenueProceedings of the VLDB Endowment · 2017
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicOptimization and Search Problems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
Fundersnot available
KeywordsSubmodular set functionIncentiveRevenueOnline advertisingViral marketingMonetizationBudget constraintKnapsack problemMicroeconomicsComputer scienceSocial graphBiddingAdvertisingMaximizationSocial mediaBusinessEconomicsThe InternetMathematical optimizationMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Incentivized social advertising, an emerging marketing model, provides monetization opportunities not only to the owners of the social networking platforms but also to their influential users by offering a "cut" on the advertising revenue. We consider a social network (the host) that sells ad-engagements to advertisers by inserting their ads, in the form of promoted posts, into the feeds of carefully selected "initial endorsers" or seed users: these users receive monetary incentives in exchange for their endorsements. The endorsements help propagate the ads to the feeds of their followers. Whenever any user engages with an ad, the host is paid some fixed amount by the advertiser, and the ad further propagates to the feed of her followers, potentially recursively. In this context, the problem for the host is is to allocate ads to influential users, taking into account the propensity of ads for viral propagation, and carefully apportioning the monetary budget of each of the advertisers between incentives to influential users and ad-engagement costs, with the rational goal of maximizing its own revenue. We show that, taking all important factors into account, the problem of revenue maximization in incentivized social advertising corresponds to the problem of monotone submodular function maximization, subject to a partition matroid constraint on the ads-to-seeds allocation, and submodular knapsack constraints on the advertisers' budgets. We show that this problem is NP-hard and devise two greedy algorithms with provable approximation guarantees, which differ in their sensitivity to seed user incentive costs. Our approximation algorithms require repeatedly estimating the expected marginal gain in revenue as well as in advertiser payment. By exploiting a connection to the recent advances made in scalable estimation of expected influence spread, we devise efficient and scalable versions of our two greedy algorithms. An extensive experimental assessment confirms the high quality of our proposal.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.011
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.007
Threshold uncertainty score0.028

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.011
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.002
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0040.005
Open science0.0030.003
Research integrity0.0030.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0070.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.019
GPT teacher head0.267
Teacher spread0.248 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations61
Published2017
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

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