MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2562363896 · doi:10.1111/corg.12192

Country‐level governance quality, ownership concentration, and debt maturity: A comparative study of Brazil and Chile

2016· article· en· W2562363896 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueCorporate Governance An International Review · 2016
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicCorporate Finance and Governance
Canadian institutionsHEC Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCorporate governanceDebtAgency costMaturity (psychological)Capital structureShareholderBusinessMonetary economicsInternal debtPrincipal–agent problemAccountingEconomicsFinancePolitical science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract Manuscript type Empirical Research Question/Issue This study investigates the interplay between country‐level governance quality and the capital structure choice at the firm level in Brazil and Chile. We examine the association between a firm's ownership concentration and its debt maturity structure and whether country‐level governance quality influences this association. Research Findings/Insights Using a large firm‐level dataset from Brazil and Chile for the period 2008–2013, we find a positive association between low ownership concentration and debt maturity. However, this association becomes negative when the largest shareholder has high ownership concentration. This result suggests that long‐term debt and ownership concentration act as substitute monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, debt maturity is inversely related to our aggregated index of country‐level governance quality, suggesting that in countries with governance systems that effectively protect debt holders, firms with high benefits of control (high ownership concentration) will use debt with shorter repayment periods in order to benefit from frequent monitoring by debt holders. Overall, our results support the view that financial markets tend to pressure firms with high benefits of control or greater agency conflict to make a tradeoff between the benefits of control and the cost and maturity structure of debt financing. Theoretical/Academic Implications This study contributes to the research on comparative corporate governance and capital structure. We also respond to recent calls to bridge the gap between under‐ and over‐socialized views of corporate governance by examining the interplay between firm‐ and country‐level governance variables. Our findings suggest a substitution effect between monitoring by equity holders and by debt holders, and that country‐level governance quality exerts a disciplinary influence over a firm's choice of debt maturity structure. Practitioner/Policy Implications Investors seeking to enter emerging markets such as Brazil and Chile can benefit from considering national governance factors that enhance debt holders’ external monitoring effectiveness. Because our findings show the importance of considering and improving the quality of country‐level governance, they are also useful for policy makers aiming to reform corporate governance practices in emerging markets.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.262
Threshold uncertainty score0.996

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.003
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.101
GPT teacher head0.321
Teacher spread0.220 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it