Ontario's Auction Market for Financial Transmission Rights: An Analysis of its Efficiency
Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
Financial transmission rights (FTR) are financial products that entitle their holder to receive a payment based on the degree of congestion in a transmission system. In many liberalized electricity markets, FTR are sold at auction by the local electricity system operator. This paper addresses several questions about the performance of FTR auctions in Ontario's restructured electricity market, including whether auction market clearing prices approximate realized payouts and whether there is any evidence that the competitiveness of auctions, as measured by the number of bidders, affects the forward market unbiasedness or informational efficiency of the auctions. The paper finds that the auction process is inefficient in the sense that market clearing prices are substantially and systematically lower than realized payouts, resulting in substantial transfers away from consumers. However, there is some evidence that the auction market is more efficient when there are three or more bidders.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it