Cooperative advertising to induce strategic customers for purchase at the full price
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract In this paper, cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain in the presence of the strategic customer is studied. It is assumed that a proportion of the customers strategically postpone their purchase in order to achieve a higher surplus. Advertising can enhance the willingness to pay (WTP) of the customers and, as a result, their surplus. In this paper, the effect of cooperative advertising in order to induce customers for early purchase is analyzed. While customer purchasing in the full price leads to higher income for the retailer, it requires spending more on advertising. This trade‐off between the benefits of inducing customers to early purchases and the advertising expenditure is a key to understanding the retailer's optimal advertising decision. On the other hand, it is interesting for the manufacturer to find out when supporting the retailer for its advertising expenditure is beneficial. Nash and Stackelberg (manufacturer as a leader) game‐theoretic models are established to investigate whether, in the channel, it is optimal to induce customers by increasing advertising expenditure or not. Results of the Stackelberg game show that the manufacturer participates in the retailer's advertising expenditure only if it leads to early purchasing of the strategic customers and the participation rate depends on the wholesale price. From the retailer's point of view, when the impact of advertising on the WTP of customers is not significant, the more the proportion of strategic customers, the more inducing customers for early purchase is beneficial. When advertising effectively increases WTP, regardless of the fraction of strategic customers, it is beneficial for the retailer to enhance its advertising in order to dissuade customers from postponing their purchase.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it