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Record W277636274

Witness for the Defense: The Compulsory Process Clause as a Limit on Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction

2010· article· en· W277636274 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Daniel J Huff

Bibliographic record

VenueTexas review of law & politics · 2010
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicEuropean Criminal Justice and Data Protection
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsLawInnocenceConstitutionDue Process ClauseParliamentInjusticePolitical scienceWitnessJurisdictionSurrenderPower (physics)Economic JusticeSociologyPolitics
DOInot available

Abstract

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I. INTRODUCTION In the winter of 1769, the British Parliament responded to unrest the colonies with a stern rebuke to the inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay: their daring insults offered to his Majesty's authority smacked of treason and those thought responsible were to be brought to England for trial.1 When the news reached American shores, the protest was swift. The Virginia House of Burgesses was session and promptly resolved that sending . . . Persons, to Places beyond the Sea, to be tried, is highly derogatory of the Rights of British subjects; as thereby the . . . Liberty of summoning and producing Witnesses on such Trial, will be taken away from the Party accused.2 The resolution passed unanimously and was soon adopted the other colonies.3 The Framers were mindful of this injustice when they drafted the Sixth Amendment. Justice Story reports his Commentaries on the Constitution that a motivating concern behind the Sixth Amendment was that a trial a distant State or territory might subject the party . . . to the inability of procuring the proper witnesses to establish his innocence.4 Though Story quickly assured the reader that [t]here is little danger, indeed, that Congress would ever exert their power such an oppressive and unjustifiable a manner,5 recent developments suggest this confidence was misplaced. Congress is increasingly criminalizing activities occurring entirely beyond our borders without sufficient attention to the Sixth Amendment promise that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have process for obtaining witnesses his favor.6 It is not clear that such laws are constitutional given that the witnesses to the alleged crime are virtually guaranteed to be abroad, beyond the reach of U.S. courts' criminal process. Without a great deal of analysis, the lower federal courts have generally held that the right to compulsory process extends only so far as the process power of the court and consequently no constitutional violation occurs simply by virtue of the fact that a defense witness is beyond that power.7 But the principal case cited for this proposition considered a very different context: United States v. Greco8 involved a prosecution for trafficking stolen property. Much of the activity occurred the United States, but the items were initially stolen Canada. At trial, the defendant made no request for a particular Canadian witness and raised the issue generally and for the first time only on appeal.9 There is a great difference between a prosecution under a statute generally applied to activity inside the U.S., where one element of the criminal enterprise happens to occur outside the United States, and a prosecution under a criminal statute having the purpose and intent of punishing conduct that occurred wholly beyond our borders. An almost certain consequence of such an extraterritorial criminal statute is that key defense witnesses will lie beyond the reach of American court process. Where this jurisdictional fact is inevitable, rather than incidental, it should not serve to excuse the government's Sixth Amendment obligations. In an earlier period, the hesitancy of legislatures and courts to exercise extraterritorial personal and subject matter jurisdiction forestalled this problem. Since World War II, that reluctance has eroded particularly with respect to universal jurisdiction for narcotics, terrorism, and human-rights related crimes. Thus far, courts have declared the Fifth Amendment the primary limit on Congress's power this context.10 However, the malleable standards of due process have not checked the legislature's increasingly aggressive assertions of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, usually because the targeted activity is found to have some effect on the U.S. or to be universally condemned. Part II of this Article examines the early history of the Compulsory Process Clause. …

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.007
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.016
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.021
Threshold uncertainty score0.071

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0070.016
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0060.010
Scholarly communication0.0100.008
Open science0.0030.004
Research integrity0.0130.011
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0210.003

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.061
GPT teacher head0.387
Teacher spread0.326 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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