Inequity Aversion, Incentives, and Personal Norms: The Effects on Budget Preparation and Use
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
ABSTRACT We examine two features of control environments expected to affect the honesty of budget submissions by subordinates and their use by managers for planning purposes. First, we predict that subordinates' awareness of incentives available to their managers that they are not eligible to share in, is likely to induce inequity aversion and dishonest budgeting. However, we expect the egocentric bias will make managers insensitive to this increased dishonesty when using budgets for planning purposes. Second, we predict that making subordinates eligible to participate in incentives available to their managers will activate a personal norm of other-regarding behavior resulting in more honest budgeting. Third, we predict that managers whose subordinates are eligible to share in their incentives will recognize factors motivating their subordinates' behavior and, as a result, rely more on their budget submissions for planning purposes. Experimental results confirm all predictions. Implications for practice and research are discussed.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it