MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2905958164

The Demand for Economic Policies, Beliefs, and Willingness-to-Pay: The Case of the Minimum Wage Policy in Quebec

2018· article· en· W2905958164 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueCIRANO Project Reports · 2018
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicHousing, Finance, and Neoliberalism
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsWillingness to payMinimum wageEconomicsLabour economicsPublic economicsWageMicroeconomics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

According to economic theory, individuals make choices based on their preferences, beliefs, and budget constraints. Does the same reasoning apply to people’s choices in the domain of public policy? Moreover, if so, can we change whether they support or reject a policy by confronting their beliefs and by changing their budget constraints? Our study approaches both questions using the case of increasing the minimum wage to $15 an hour in Quebec. We administered an online survey-experiment to 2, 255 Quebeckers whose demographic characteristics were mainly representative of the general population. We collected their opinions on whether the hourly minimum wage should be equal to $15 (it was $10.75 at the time of the survey). The survey inquired if the individual respondent believed that he (she) or her family will directly benefit from the increase. We then elicited respondents’ knowledge of specific facts about the Quebec economy and their beliefs about possible consequences of raising the minimum wage. We also measured their social preferences using a modified dictator game, as well as their values using a series of questions about attitudes to redistribution, unemployed individuals, and perceptions of whether effort drives success (as opposed to luck or other factors). At the end of the survey, we administered an economic literacy test and measured respondents’ reasoning abilities using the Cognitive Reasoning Test and a numeracy test. We then provided all respondents with the factual information about the current minimum hourly wage (in absolute terms and relative to the average hourly wage) and the proportion of workers who earn the minimum wage. Next, we randomly assigned participants to one of seven groups. All seven groups received the factual information that we described above. The first group did not receive any other information. The remaining six groups received information about hypothetical consequences of raising the minimum wage in addition to the factual information. Out of these six groups that received the hypothetical scenarios, the first three groups received one hypothetical scenario each about a possible loss of employment (10%, 30%, or 50%, respectively). The remaining three groups received one hypothetical scenario each about a possible increase in prices (5-10%, 15-20%, and 25-30%, respectively). After respondents read the provided factual information and hypothetical scenarios (if they had one), we asked them again whether the minimum wage should be raised. Losses of employment can be thought of as a cost of the minimum wage increase directly to workers who earn the minimum wage. Price increases can be thought of as a cost of the minimum wage increase directly to the respondents. Therefore, we treat responses after the information treatment as a willingness to pay for the policy, either as costs to others or as direct costs to self. We report several findings: Before the information treatment, opinions about raising the minimum wage were consistent with respondents’ preferences, beliefs, economic literacy, and their reasoning abilities. After the information treatment, opinions in favour of raising the minimum wage decreased in all seven groups. The smallest decrease in support occurred after the provision of the factual information alone (group 1). In the remaining six groups, the support for raising the minimum wage decreased as the hypothetical consequences of raising the minimum wage became more costly. Respondents predominantly overestimated the proportion of workers who earn the minimum wage and underestimated the level of income considered a poverty threshold. Respondents also tended to believe that in a market economy high wages are mostly due to responsible business leaders and that the minimum wage is lower than a market wage. A substantial proportion of respondents also expected positive outcomes on the labour market due to an increase in the minimum wage such as no loss of employment and more job opportunities for the unemployed. Respondents’ beliefs about the consequences of raising the minimum wage appeared link to their political preferences. When provided with the factual information in group 1, respondents with erroneous beliefs were the most likely to reduce their support for the policy. When provided with hypothetical scenarios, respondents whose beliefs contradicted the information in hypothetical scenarios were the most likely to reduce their support for the policy. In each of the seven groups, out of the respondents who initially did not support the increase in the minimum wage, there were between 10% and 25% of respondents who changed their mind after the information treatment and expressed support for the policy. The largest proportion of individuals who changed their mind (25%) was in group 2 where the hypothetical scenario asked about a 10% loss in employment if the minimum wage increases. Conditional on the participant’s initial choice to support the increase in minimum wage to $15, we observe a good deal of heterogeneity among the participants in the dynamics of their decision before and after information: while many switched from “Yes” to “No, ” some went from “No” to “Yes.” Compared with individuals who believed in large employment losses, believing in some loss or hardly any loss was associated with a higher probability of switching opinions from “Yes” to “No” (by 12.6 and 13.2 percentage points, respectively). The respondents who turned favourable to raising the minimum wage after the information treatment tended to over-estimate the consequences relative to hypothetical scenarios they were presented. We conclude that the demand for the increase in the minimum wage is consistent with individuals’ preferences and beliefs. Moreover, as the price of the policy increases, the demand for the policy drops. This drop is most prominent among those whose beliefs differed from the hypothetical scenarios that we provided. Respondents appear to be more sensitive to the costs of the policy regarding job losses than regarding prices. Given that we elicited stated rather than revealed willingness-to-pay, it is possible that respondents understate their willingness to pay the costs regarding losses of jobs, and overstate their willingness to pay the costs regarding higher prices. French version of this project report Avec l’émergence d’Internet et des médias sociaux, tous les gouvernements sont confrontés à un défi considérable quand il s’agit d’informer la population de la pertinence de leurs politiques, et ce, d’autant plus en période électorale. « Dans une ère où règnent les fakes news et un certain cynisme envers la politique, cette étude CIRANO tente justement de mieux comprendre les déterminants de l’appui aux politiques économiques. Est-ce que les croyances, la connaissance des concepts économiques, la volonté de payer peuvent affecter l’appui du public à l’égard d’une politique ? » se demande Claude Montmarquette, coauteur de l’étude, professeur émérite à l’Université de Montréal et fellow CIRANO. L’étude permet de conclure qu’informer la population sur des faits se révèle être un déterminant important dans les changements en termes d’appui et de soutien à des politiques économiques. Dans ce contexte, miser sur l’éducation générale de la population et plus particulièrement augmenter le niveau de littératie économique s’avère capital. L’augmentation du salaire minimum au Québec est utilisée ici comme étude de cas pour illustrer la recherche. Extrêmement dense en informations et en chiffres de tout ordre, cette étude se base entre autres sur un sondage en ligne, réalisé en avril 2017 auprès de 2 255 Québécois, qui a permis de recueillir de l’information sur les connaissances économiques générales des Québécois, leurs croyances quant aux conséquences possibles d’une augmentation du salaire minimum sur les prix et l’emploi, leurs préférences sociales, leurs valeurs et également leurs capacités de raisonnement. Les répondants ont ensuite été aléatoirement divisés en sept groupes auxquels ont été donnés différentes informations. Tous ont reçu la même information factuelle sur le salaire minimum (comme la proportion des travailleurs qui gagnent le salaire minimum, le montant absolu du salaire minimum et le montant relatif par rapport au salaire moyen). Six groupes ont reçu en plus un supplément d’information (différent d’un groupe à l’autre) sur les conséquences hypothétiques d’une augmentation du salaire minimum sur l’emploi des travailleurs rémunérés au salaire minimum et le niveau des prix. « Deux décisions sont intéressantes pour notre étude. La première est de savoir si « oui » ou « non » les répondants sont en faveur d’une augmentation du salaire minimum avant qu’on leur ait donné toutes informations factuelles et complémentaires relatives au salaire minimum. La deuxième concerne le même choix « oui » ou « non », mais après avoir reçu cette information sur le salaire minimum » explique M. Montmarquette. Nous vous livrons ici les résultats les plus marquants. Des connaissances moyennes de la population à propos de l’économie du Québec La plupart des répondants ont correctement identifié le montant du taux du salaire minimum au Québec (soit 10, 75 $ au moment du sondage). Toutefois, seulement 4, 5 % ont su estimer la proportion des travailleurs rémunérés au salaire minimum au Québec, qui se situe entre 5 et 9, 99 %. La majorité des répondants a ainsi grandement surestimé la proportion de travailleurs qui gagnent le salaire minimum. Les répondants avaient également tendance à croire que, dans une économie de marché, les salaires élevés sont principalement attribuables à des chefs d’entreprise responsables (seulement 34, 5 % des répondants ont affirmé que les salaires élevés dépendent du rendement élevé des travailleurs – qui était la réponse exacte). Après leur avoir donné une définition du salaire de marché, seulement 12, 5 % des Québécois ont répondu la bonne répon

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.866
Threshold uncertainty score0.924

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.022
GPT teacher head0.264
Teacher spread0.243 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it