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Record W2908334818 · doi:10.1051/ro/2019007

Z-equilibria in Bi-matrix games with uncertain payoffs

2019· article· en· W2908334818 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueRAIRO - Operations Research · 2019
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicEconomic theories and models
Canadian institutionsCarleton UniversityStatistics Canada
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMathematical economicsNash equilibriumPareto principleGame theoryMathematical optimizationNormal-form gameRanking (information retrieval)ComputationPareto optimalFictitious playMathematicsMatrix (chemical analysis)Best responseSolution conceptEquilibrium selectionComputer scienceRepeated gameMulti-objective optimizationAlgorithmArtificial intelligence

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The concept of Z -equilibrium has been introduced by Zhuk-ovskii (Mathematical Methods in Operations Research. Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia (1985) 103–195) for games in normal form. This concept is always Pareto optimal and individually rational for the players. Moreover, Pareto optimal Nash equilibria are Z -equilibria. We consider a bi-matrix game whose payoffs are uncertain variables. By appropriate ranking criteria of Liu uncertainty theory, we introduce some concepts of equilibrium based on Z -equilibrium for such games. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of the introduced concepts. Moreover, using mathematical programming, we present a procedure for their computation. A numerical example is provided for illustration.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.821
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.003

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.074
GPT teacher head0.334
Teacher spread0.259 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it