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Record W2912418312

Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

2009· article· en· W2912418312 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceBiddingPresentation (obstetrics)Game theoryCompetition (biology)Operations researchLibrary scienceEngineeringBusiness
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

These proceedings present the technical contributions to the Tenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce EC'09, held during July 6-10, 2009 in Stanford, California, USA. Since its inception in 1999, ACM EC has served as the leading scientific conference on advances in theory, systems, and applications for electronic commerce. The natural focus of the conference is on computer science issues, but the conference is interdisciplinary and addresses many facets of electronic commerce including (1) theory and foundations; (2) languages; (3) automation, personalization, and targeting; (4) security, privacy, encryption, and digital rights; (5) applications and empirical studies; and (6) social and human factors. In addition to the main technical program, EC'09 featured two workshops on Ad Auctions and The Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation and four tutorials on Convergence of Nash Dynamics: Equilibria and Nearly-Optimal Solutions, A Computational Perspective on Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts, Information Exchange, Bidding Languages and Competition in Sponsored Search, and Mechanism Design in Dynamic Settings. The call for papers attracted 161 submissions from academia and industry around the world, including Africa, Asia, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. Each paper was reviewed on average by a total of 6 reviewers, 4 from the program and 2 from the senior program committees respectively, on the basis of scientific novelty, technical quality, and importance to the field. The program committee selected 40 papers for presentation at the conference and most of them are published in the proceedings. At the authors' request, only abstracts for the three remaining papers are included along with pointers to full versions of these working papers. This accommodates the practices of fields outside of computer science in which journal rather than conference publishing is the norm and conference publishing sometimes precludes journal publishing. It is expected that many of the papers in these proceedings will appear in a more polished and complete form in scientific journals in the future. The committee has singled out two papers as co-winners of the outstanding paper award. • Eliciting Truthful Answers to Multiple-Choice Questions, by Nicolas Lambert and Yoav Shoham, Stanford University • An Optimal Lower Bound for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms, by Itai Ashlagi, Harvard University, Shahar Dobzinski, Hebrew University and Ron Lavi, Technion The first paper was also named as the winner of the best student paper award. EC '09 also hosted two invited keynote addresses. • Susan Athey, Harvard University and Microsoft (joint with TARK XII) • Michael Moritz, Sequoia Capital EC'09 introduced for the first time in this conference series the two-tier reviewing processing involving 13 senior program committee members and 90 program committee members. We sincerely thank all of them for their hard work in ensuring the quality and fairness of the paper reviewing and final program selection process. We'd like to also thank the authors for their submissions and participation in the feedback.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.367
Threshold uncertainty score0.793

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.116
GPT teacher head0.393
Teacher spread0.276 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Quick stats

Citations46
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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