Power Allocation and Pricing in Multiuser Relay Networks Using Stackelberg and Bargaining Games
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper considers a multiuser single-relay wireless network, where the relay gets paid for helping users forward signals, and the users pay to receive the relay service. We study the relay power allocation and pricing problems and model the interaction between the users and the relay as a two-level Stackelberg game. In this game, the relay, which is modeled as the service provider and the leader of the game, sets the relay price to maximize its revenue, whereas the users are modeled as customers and followers who buy power from the relay for higher transmission rates. We use a bargaining game to model the negotiation among users to achieve a fair allocation of relay power. Based on the proposed fair relay power allocation rule, the optimal relay power price that maximizes the relay revenue is derived analytically. Simulation shows that the proposed power allocation scheme achieves higher network sum rate and relay revenue than the even power allocation. Furthermore, compared with the sum-rate-optimal solution, simulation shows that the proposed scheme achieves better fairness with comparable network sum rate for a wide range of network scenarios. The proposed pricing and power allocation solutions are also shown to be consistent with the laws of supply and demand.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it