Bibliographic record
Abstract
Recent years have proven that the OSCE can be stronger, more effective, and can act in an immediate and decisive manner.Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Belgrade, 3 December 20151More than 40 years after the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the ongoing crisis in and around Ukraine brought the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) back to the centre of security discussions. Even if it is too early to draw final conclusions from what may be considered the greatest crisis of the post-1990 European security order, two main consequences for the OSCE can already be highlighted.On the one hand, the organisation's normative acquis has been profoundly challenged, thus raising doubts about its legitimacy as an organisation of cooperative security based on commonly agreed standards and values. As Germany's foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the Organisation's chairman for 2016, puts it: Russia's actions towards its neighbour and the ongoing crisis in and around Ukraine have called into question the OSCE's common fundamental principles and values established in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, in the Charter of Paris and in other key OSCE documents.2 Just three years before the events in Kyiv, heads of state and government of the OSCE's then 56 participating states had gathered for a summit in Astana and reaffirmed important common principles in a commemorative declaration.On the other hand, the reaction of the OSCE structures to the events in Ukraine showed the relevance of the Organisation's operational capacities in the field of crisis management, especially when guided by strong political leadership. In 2014, Swiss foreign minister Didier Burkhalter, then chairman, mobilised the OSCE's broad range of instruments, such as facilitating dialogue and reconciliation, monitoring and capacity building. Numerous efforts by different OSCE executive structures (such as the newly established Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine or the Warsawbased Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ODIHR) have proven the OSCE's operational relevance on the ground, serving as a tool box available for crisis management.Against this background, some observers might argue that the OSCE as an organisation has been deeply damaged by the crisis of the European security order, leading to the end (or at least the temporary suspension) of the cooperative approach to security the OSCE stands for. For them, the current crisis is just one more proof that the OSCE is not able to bring to fruition the idealistic vision of peace and democracy in Europe, promoted by the Charter of Paris, let alone a system of European collective security.The OSCE is indeed at a crucial point in its history. However, this contribution argues, that it is not despite, but because of the current crisis that the OSCE is more relevant than ever and that it is well placed within the European security architecture to contribute substantially to the restoration of security and stability in Europe, provided that it gets strong political backing of its participating states for the full implementation of its comprehensive security concept, including the strengthening of the politicomilitary dimension.As the largest regional security organisation in the world, through its geographical scope (both Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian, ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostok), its broad thematic approach to cooperative security (the concept of comprehensive security, covering a politico-military, economic and human dimension), its principles-based character (based on politically binding commitments) and its operational character as a platform for dialogue and as a toolbox for crisis management, the OSCE delivers added value to the European security architecture, compared, for example, to NATO, as an organisation of collective defence, or to the Council of Europe, based on legally binding and justiciable norms. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.013 | 0.025 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.015 | 0.016 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.017 | 0.020 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.018 |
| Research integrity | 0.009 | 0.017 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.025 | 0.006 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".