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Record W3022650078 · doi:10.1109/mper.2002.4311904

Economic Inefficiencies and Cross-Subsidies in an Auction-Based Electricity Pool

2002· article· en· W3022650078 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueIEEE Power Engineering Review · 2002
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEngineering
TopicElectric Power System Optimization
Canadian institutionsMcGill UniversityHydro-Québec
Fundersnot available
KeywordsSubsidyElectricityElectricity marketEconomic dispatchComputer scienceEconomicsMathematical optimizationMicroeconomicsAuction algorithmPower (physics)Auction theoryRevenue equivalenceCommon value auctionElectric power systemMathematicsEngineering

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper compares two contrasting yet often used electricity market-clearing procedures: an auction-based algorithm including congestion management and transmission loss cost allocation and an optimal power flow. The suction procedure produces a single-period unit commitment and, hence, can be compared directly to an optimal power flow solution. These algorithms are compared in terms of the economic efficiency of the solution attained, and in terms of cross-subsidies among generators and demands. The purpose of this comparison is to quantify the actual cost to market participants of using a simple, seemingly transparent procedure, such as an auction-based algorithm, versus an integrated but computationally intensive one, such as an optimal power flow.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.350
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.009
GPT teacher head0.221
Teacher spread0.211 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it