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Record W3024498238 · doi:10.3982/te4712

Two‐stage majoritarian choice

2022· article· en· W3024498238 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueTheoretical Economics · 2022
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversité de Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMathematical economicsArrowIndependence of irrelevant alternativesRationalityIndependence (probability theory)Social choice theoryClass (philosophy)PreferencePreference relationConsistency (knowledge bases)Transitive relationPartition (number theory)MathematicsRevealed preferenceSet (abstract data type)EconomicsMicroeconomicsComputer scienceEconometricsDiscrete mathematicsCombinatoricsEpistemologyStatisticsArtificial intelligence

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on a linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first of these relations is used to pare down the set of the feasible alternatives into a shortlist while the second is used to make a final choice from the shortlist. Rules in this class are characterized by four properties: two classical rationality requirements (Sen's Expansion Consistency and Manzini and Mariotti's Weak WARP ); and adaptations of two classical collective choice requirements (Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Saari and Barney's No Preference Reversal Bias ). These rules also satisfy some other desirable properties, including an adaptation of May's Positive Responsiveness .

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.327
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0150.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.021
GPT teacher head0.220
Teacher spread0.199 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it