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Record W3121470554

High Drug Prices, Big R&D Spenders and “Free Riders”: Canada in the Topsy Turvy World of Pharmaceuticals

2019· article· en· W3121470554 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueC.D. Howe Institute Commentary · 2019
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicPharmaceutical Economics and Policy
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBusinessSubsidyGovernment (linguistics)NegotiationPurchasingPharmaceutical industryPublic economicsIncentiveFinanceEconomicsMarketingMarket economyLawPolitical scienceBiotechnology
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The main reason why health and general living standards in the world’s developed countries are so much better than in earlier eras is that today’s technology is much more advanced. But new technology does not come for free. Most of it, in healthcare and elsewhere, comes about because large amounts of resources are spent on R&D. All countries, especially those with high per-capita incomes, face an inevitable tension between their obligation to contribute their fair share to global pharmaceutical R&D financing and their desire to save money for the taxpayers, private insurers and patients who pay for drugs. In this Commentary, we compare how patent law and pharmaceutical regulation help determine drug prices in Canada, the US, and major countries in Europe and Australasia. Different countries respond in different ways to balancing the need to contain drug spending with contributing to the development of new pharmaceutical technologies that improve our ability to treat previously untreatable conditions. Government policy in many other countries plays a more comprehensive role than it does in Canada, either in the form of direct regulation of drug prices or via the government’s role, direct or indirect, in the process under which insurance plans negotiate with pharmaceutical companies about drug purchasing and pricing. Specifically, we examine what policies Canada should pursue to help overcome criticism that it is a free rider while avoiding paying more than its fair share. With complex interactions between regulations, patent laws, and R&D tax incentives and subsidies, it is difficult to determine whether Canada’s contributions to global pharmaceutical R&D are “optimal.” It is clear, however, that Canada is less of a free-rider than some other countries that employ restrictive drug pricing policies. Conversely, evidence suggests that US consumers pay more than their fair share towards pharmaceutical R&D due to high prices. Though lower than in the US, published prices of patented pharmaceuticals in Canada are comparable to or higher than in many other developed nations, as are our contributions to business R&D through direct funding and tax expenditures. We recommend that Canada pursue a two-track strategy. In the short run, we benefit from and, therefore, should aim for the lowest drug prices that we can get without inviting opposition from our main trading partners. But we should simultaneously work with our trading partners and international agencies toward a model of global R&D funding that overcomes the free-rider problem and moves us closer to a more efficient management of this aspect of the global commons.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.633
Threshold uncertainty score0.772

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.050
GPT teacher head0.260
Teacher spread0.210 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it