Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?
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Abstract
Fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to “starve the Leviathan” to reduce political rents. Voters observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public goods or lower taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation: Procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in more corrupt democracies.
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The record
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Topic
- Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
- Field
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance
- Canadian institutions
- —
- Funders
- Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della RicercaCanadian Institute for Advanced Research
- Keywords
- Government (linguistics)Fiscal policyEconomicsPolitical scienceEconomic historyKeynesian economicsPhilosophyLinguistics
- Has abstract in OpenAlex
- yes