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Record W3124794763 · doi:10.1016/j.intmar.2020.08.003

Empirical Analyses of Nonlinear Effects of Reserve Prices on Ending Prices in Online Auctions

2021· article· en· W3124794763 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

fundA Canadian funder is recorded on the work.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Interactive Marketing · 2021
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersSocial Sciences and Humanities Research Council of CanadaNational Natural Science Foundation of China
KeywordsCommon value auctionEconomicsReservation priceOpen market operationCompetition (biology)Mid pricePrice levelEconometricsMonetary economicsMicroeconomicsMonetary policy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Empirical results about the effect of open reserve price on ending prices in auctions are mixed, with some researchers finding a positive effect on ending price and others reporting a negative or no effect. The objective of this research is to propose a new theoretical framework. First, without an open reserve price, auctions attract more bidders, resulting in increased competition and higher ending prices—a so-called competition effect. Second, a high open reserve price may serve as a price floor or a reference price, influencing bidders’ valuations and increasing ending prices. Quantile regression is used, which has the advantage of providing robust parameter estimates of the effect of open reserve prices on ending prices for different levels of the reserve price. Estimates of a longitudinal data set for four products collected over a period of one year show an u-shaped relationship between open reserve prices and ending prices, where either no reserves or high reserves results in higher ending prices. By comparing ending prices of auctions with an open reserve versus a secret reserve, it is shown that open reserve prices have a reference-price effect rather than a price-floor effect.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.039
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMetaresearch
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Bench or experimental · Consensus signal: Bench or experimental
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.196
Threshold uncertainty score0.969

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.039
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.162
GPT teacher head0.512
Teacher spread0.350 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it