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Record W3125032534 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3066

When Anomalies Are Publicized Broadly, Do Institutions Trade Accordingly?

2019· article· en· W3125032534 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueManagement Science · 2019
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicFinancial Markets and Investment Strategies
Canadian institutionsQueen's University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsArbitrageIncentiveInstitutional investorHedge fundBusinessMarket efficiencyTrading strategyMonetary economicsStock (firearms)Financial economicsStock marketAnomaly (physics)EconomicsAccountingFinanceMicroeconomicsCorporate governance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper studies whether institutional investors trade on 14 well documented stock market anomalies. We show that there is an increase in anomaly-based trading when information about the anomalies is readily available through academic publications and the release of necessary accounting data. This finding is more pronounced among hedge funds and institutions with high turnover, that is, the subset of investors who likely have the abilities and incentives to act on the anomalies. We directly relate the increase in trading to the observed decay in post-publication anomaly returns. Our results support the role of institutional investors in the arbitrage process and in improving market efficiency. This paper was accepted by Renée Adams, finance.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.848
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.002
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.042
GPT teacher head0.229
Teacher spread0.187 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it