The Art of Breaking the Deal: What President Trump Can and Can’t Do About NAFTA
Bibliographic record
Abstract
President-elect Trump has repeatedly said that he could tear up NAFTA. Can the president unilaterally cause the US to withdraw from NAFTA or must Congress agree? Congress must concur because the president and Congress have joint authority over trade agreements. However, unless Congress actively resists a presidential attempt to unilaterally withdraw from NAFTA, the US courts will not intervene, underscoring the importance to Canada of working closely with Congress. Further, the president has the power to frustrate NAFTA by taking various executive actions. While the sole power to impose duties under the US Constitution rests with Congress, Congress has delegated powers to the president to act unilaterally to address national emergencies and balance-of-payments and national security situations. These powers include the ability to raise tariffs and to adopt other border measures. The exercise of such powers could be very costly to the US economy and would doubtless provoke retaliation from US trading partners and litigation both in the US court system and before international bodies such as the WTO. While the president’s anti-NAFTA rhetoric has been directed at offshoring and balance of payments issues with Mexico, Canada is at risk of being sideswiped by aggressive anti-trade and anti-NAFTA measures that the president may adopt. Canada must be prepared to renegotiate NAFTA with the US administration, preferably on a trilateral basis that includes Mexico. However, the Canadian government must also exercise its rights under international trade agreements. The governments of Canada and Mexico need to secure support in Congress. Members of the House and Senate will be sensitive to damage to US businesses and job loss in their congressional districts and in their home states caused by the adoption of punitive trade measures.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.009 | 0.026 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.016 | 0.023 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.017 | 0.020 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.013 | 0.020 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.009 | 0.003 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".