A Trust-Driven Contract Incentive Scheme for Mobile Crowd-Sensing Networks
Bibliographic record
Abstract
By leveraging the power of crowd, the prevalence of mobile devices in mobile crowd-sensing (MCS) networks helps and provides a wide range of sensing services through collecting and sharing sensing data. However, due to the diverse behaviours of mobile users, unreliable or malicious users and platforms could provide untrusted data, which affects the quality of sensing service. Besides, mobile users are reluctant to participate in sensing tasks without sufficient incentives. It is desirable to design a trust and incentive scheme to improve the service efficiency of MCS. In this paper, we propose a novel trust-driven contract incentive framework in MCS, which guarantees the service quality and stimulates mobile users to join sensing tasks. We first design a trust evaluation scheme between mobile users and sensing platforms based on the historical interactions to derive the reliability value of sensing platform. Then, the trust threshold is formulated to filter out malicious sensing platforms. By considering the privacy preferences of mobile users, we establish a contract incentive scheme to maximize the utility of both mobile users and sensing platforms. The design objective is to derive a set of optimal contracts under both discrete and continuous contract models. Meanwhile, the designed contracts guarantee the individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) properties. Finally, simulations are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed trust-driven contract incentive scheme, and results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can jointly improve the quality of sensing service and maximize the utilities of mobile users and sensing platforms.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.011 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".