Bibliographic record
Abstract
Increasing reliance on scientific evidence in litigation has created a demand for discussions directed at enabling a legitimate interaction between science and law. The article develops the notion of procedural legitimacy-that adherence to legal procedure maintains the legitimacy of the adjudicative system and its outcomes -and applies it to determining how best to admit and use scientific evidence. The problem of undervaluing procedural legitimacy is illustrated through a commentary on contributions to the science and law discussion of Edmond and Roach, and Haack. The author's thesis is that maintaining adjudicative legitimacy depends on procedural rules being applied as vigilantly to science as to any other evidence. Accordingly, admissibility rules must be properly applied to scientific evidence and, once admitted, the evidence must be scrutinized and weighed against the legal standard of proof. The recommendations for treatment of scientific evidence in the Goudge Inquiry Report are endorsed based on their consistency with the demands of procedural legitimacy.L'importance accrue donnee aux preuves scientifiques dans les litiges a cree une demande pour des discussions visant a favoriser une interaction legitime entre la science et le droit. L'article prend comme point de depart la legitimite procedurale-la certitude que le respect de la procedure legale preserve la legitimite du systeme decisionnel et de ses resultats-et l'applique pour determiner la meilleure facon d'admettre et d'utiliser les preuves scientifiques. Le probleme resultant de la sous-evaluation de la legitimite procedurale est illustre par des commentaires sur les contributions de la science et du droit de MM. Edmond et Mme Roach, et Haack. L'auteure avance la these que pour preserver la legitimite decisionnelle, les regles procedurales doivent etre appliquees aussi rigoureusement aux preuves scientifiques qu'aux preuves de toute autre nature. Par consequent, les regles d'admissibilite doivent etre appliquees de facon appropriee aux preuves scientifiques et, une fois admis, les elements de preuve doivent etre examines et evalues selon la norme legale de preuve. L'article appuie les recommandations concernant le traitement des preuves scientifiques dans le rapport de la commission d'enquete Goudge, etant donne qu'elles satisfont aux exigences de la legitimite procedurale.IntroductionI. Highlights from Canadian case lawII. Procedural legitimacy in science and law1. Procedural legitimacy in science: legitimate outcomes despite uncertainty2. Procedural legitimacy in law: legitimate outcomes despite uncertainty3. Application to the science and law interactionIII. The commentaries of Haack, Edmond and Roach1. Susan Haack2. Edmond and Roach: a contextual approach to the admissibility of state s forensic science and medical evidenceIV. Procedural legitimacy applied to the science and law interaction1. Defining scope of expertise at the admissibility stage2. Determining threshold reliability: avoiding idealization of science3. Threshold vs ultimate reliability: maintaining procedural legitimacy4. Utility of adversarial process5. Recommendation regarding education6. OverviewConclusionIntroductionThe temptation to borrow legitimacy from science is hard to resist. When science is understood as a passionate though objective inquiry into truth, it is hard to imagine a more desirable conclusion than the one reached scientifically. Scientific conclusions have an air of legitimacy that other fields of inquiry can not help but envy, and law is no exception. The discussions surrounding science and law, both in case law and commentaries, contain the sentiment that consistency with science enhances the legitimacy of adjudicative decisions. Certainly, it is desirable to avoid legal decisions that are blatantly contrary to scientific knowledge. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.056 | 0.057 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.007 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.010 | 0.157 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.028 | 0.027 |
| Open science | 0.006 | 0.010 |
| Research integrity | 0.014 | 0.022 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".