The Philosophy of Free Will:: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Introduction I. The Free Will Problem - Real or illusory? 1. Thomas Nagel - Moral Luck 2. Daniel Dennett - Please Don't Feed the Bugbears II. Naturalism Against Scepticism 3. P. F. Strawson - Freedom and Resentment 4. Gary Watson - Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme III. The Consequence Argument 5. Peter van Inwagen - The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism 6. Dana Nelkin - The Consequence Argument and the Mind Argument IV. Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities 7. Harry Frankfurt - Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility 8. Michael Otsuka - Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame 9. Kadri Vihvelin - Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account V. Libertarian Alternatives - Soft and Hard 10. Robert Kane - Responsibility, Luck and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Determinism 11. Randolph Clarke - Towards a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will 12. Timothy O'Connor - Agent-Causal Power VI. Compatibilism: Hierarchical Theories and Manipulation Problems 13. Harry Frankfurt - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person 14. Richard Double - Puppeteers, Hypnotists, and Neurosurgeons VII. Compatibilism: Reason-Based Alternatives 15. Susan Wolf - Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility 16. John M. Fischer - My Compatibilism VIII. Autonomy and History 17. John Christman - Autonomy and Personal History 18. Michael McKenna - Responsibility & Globally Manipulated Agents IX. Scepticism, Illusionism and Revisionism 19. Galen Strawson - The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility 20. Saul Smilansky - Free Will: From Nature to Illusion 21. Manuel Vargas - How To Solve the Free Will Problem X. Optimism, Pessimism and their Modes 22. Derk Pereboom - Optimistic Skepticism about Free Will 23. Paul Russell - Compatibilist-Fatalism XI. The Phenomenology of Agency and Experimental Philosophy 24. Benjamin Libet - Do We have Free Will? 25. Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - The Phenomenology of Free Will 26. Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it