Quantifying Location Privacy for Navigation Services in Sustainable Vehicular Networks
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Current connected and autonomous vehicles will contribute to various and green vehicular services. However, sharing personal data with untrustworthy Navigation Service Providers (NSPs) raises serious location concerns. To address this issue, many Location Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) have been proposed. In addition, several quantification methods have been designed to help understand location privacy and illustrate how location privacy is leaked. However, their assessment is insufficient due to the incomplete assumptions about the adversary’s model. In particular, users tend to request the same navigation routes from <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">home</i> to <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">workplace</i> and acquire traffic information along the route. An adversary can collect the coordinates of adjacent locations and infer the two true locations. In this paper, we provide a formal framework for the analysis of LPPMs in navigation services. Our framework captures extra information that is available to an adversary performing localization attacks. By formalizing the adversary’s performance, we also propose and justify two new metrics to quantify location privacy in navigation services, namely <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">accuracy</i> and <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">visibility</i> . We assess the efficacy of two popular LPPMs for location privacy, i.e., differential privacy and <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">${k}$ </tex-math></inline-formula> -anonymity. Experimental results demonstrate that the adversary can recover users’ locations with a high probability.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.009 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it