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Record W4223947403 · doi:10.3389/frai.2022.826737

AI Technologies, Privacy, and Security

2022· article· en· W4223947403 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence · 2022
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicEthics and Social Impacts of AI
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Regina
Fundersnot available
KeywordsInternet privacyComputer securityComputer science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Privacy remains one of the most recurrent concerns that people have about AI technologies. The meaning of the concept of “privacy” has proven to be fairly elusive. Accordingly, the concerns people have about privacy are often vague and ill-formed, which makes it correspondingly difficult to address these concerns, and to explain the ways in which AI technologies do or do not pose threats to people's interests. In this article, we draw attention to some important distinctions that are frequently overlooked, and spell out their implications for concerns about the threats that AI-related technology poses for privacy. We argue that, when people express concerns about privacy in relation to AI technologies, they are usually referring to security interests rather than interests in privacy per se . Nevertheless, we argue that focusing primarily on security interests misses the importance that interests in privacy per se have through their contribution to autonomy and the development of our identities. Improving insight about these issues can make it easier for the developers of AI technologies to provide explanations for users about what interests are and are not at stake through the use of AI systems.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.578
Threshold uncertainty score0.947

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.047
GPT teacher head0.353
Teacher spread0.305 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it