Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract A key encapsulation mechanism ( <m:math xmlns:m="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <m:mi mathvariant="sans-serif">KEM</m:mi> </m:math> {\mathsf{KEM}} ) that takes as input an arbitrary string, i.e., a tag, is known as tag- <m:math xmlns:m="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <m:mi mathvariant="sans-serif">KEM</m:mi> </m:math> {\mathsf{KEM}} , while a scheme that combines signature and encryption is called signcryption. In this article, we present a code-based signcryption tag- <m:math xmlns:m="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <m:mi mathvariant="sans-serif">KEM</m:mi> </m:math> {\mathsf{KEM}} scheme. We utilize a code-based signature and an <m:math xmlns:m="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <m:mi mathvariant="sans-serif">IND</m:mi> <m:mstyle> <m:mspace width="0.1em"/> <m:mtext>-</m:mtext> <m:mspace width="0.1em"/> </m:mstyle> <m:mi mathvariant="sans-serif">CCA2</m:mi> </m:math> {\mathsf{IND}}\hspace{0.1em}\text{-}\hspace{0.1em}{\mathsf{CCA2}} (adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) secure version of McEliece’s encryption scheme. The proposed scheme uses an equivalent subcode as a public code for the receiver, making the NP-completeness of the subcode equivalence problem be one of our main security assumptions. We then base the signcryption tag- <m:math xmlns:m="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <m:mi mathvariant="sans-serif">KEM</m:mi> </m:math> {\mathsf{KEM}} to design a code-based hybrid signcryption scheme. A hybrid scheme deploys asymmetric- as well as symmetric-key encryption. We give security analyses of both our schemes in the standard model and prove that they are secure against <m:math xmlns:m="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <m:mi mathvariant="sans-serif">IND</m:mi> <m:mstyle> <m:mspace width="0.1em"/> <m:mtext>-</m:mtext> <m:mspace width="0.1em"/> </m:mstyle> <m:mi mathvariant="sans-serif">CCA2</m:mi> </m:math> {\mathsf{IND}}\hspace{0.1em}\text{-}\hspace{0.1em}{\mathsf{CCA2}} (indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) and <m:math xmlns:m="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <m:mi mathvariant="sans-serif">SUF</m:mi> <m:mstyle> <m:mspace width="0.1em"/> <m:mtext>-</m:mtext> <m:mspace width="0.1em"/> </m:mstyle> <m:mi mathvariant="sans-serif">CMA</m:mi> </m:math> {\mathsf{SUF}}\hspace{0.1em}\text{-}\hspace{0.1em}{\mathsf{CMA}} (strong existential unforgeability under chosen message attack).
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it