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Record W4231870457 · doi:10.1002/bltj.20367

Authenticating displayed names in telephony

2009· article· en· W4231870457 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueBell Labs Technical Journal · 2009
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEngineering
TopicIPv6, Mobility, Handover, Networks, Security
Canadian institutionsBell (Canada)
FundersIntel Corporation
KeywordsVoice over IPComputer securityPublic key infrastructureSpoofing attackSIP trunkingTelephonyAuthentication (law)Session Initiation ProtocolThe InternetComputer scienceTelecommunicationsBusinessPublic-key cryptographyComputer networkWorld Wide WebServer

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In both traditional and Internet Protocol (IP) telephony, a caller ID number is subject to control and verification, whereas the displayable caller ID name is a convenience feature which operators have no control over. It may be arbitrarily set by the caller. Voice phishing can exploit this weakness-e.g., make a call spoofing the name of a bank and ask for account information. We present a framework that allows each call participant to authenticate the displayed name of other parties via public name registries and International Telecommunication Union Telecom Standardization Sector (ITU-T) X.509 certificates. The authentication can work end-to-end, on-demand, for both called and calling party's name, for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), landline, or mobile endpoints. The framework is flexible, does not require global public key infrastructure (PKI), and allows concerned financial, medical, and legal institutions to delegate the use of their authenticated names to employees outside the office as well as outsourcing companies. A proof-of-concept implementation is also presented.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.572
Threshold uncertainty score0.889

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.004
GPT teacher head0.216
Teacher spread0.212 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it