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Record W4238860425 · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.26.4.900

Updating geographical knowledge: Principles of coherence and inertia.

2000· article· en· W4238860425 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.
fundA Canadian funder is recorded on the work.

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · 2000
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicGeography Education and Pedagogy
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Alberta
FundersNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
KeywordsCoherence (philosophical gambling strategy)InertiaComputer scienceGeographyMathematicsPhysicsStatisticsClassical mechanics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In 2 experiments, the authors investigated how representations of global geography are updated when people learn new location information about individual cities.Participants estimated the latitude of cities in North America (Experiment 1) and in the Old and New Worlds (Experiment 2).After making their first estimates, participants were given information about the latitudes of 2 cities and asked to make a second set of estimates.Both the first and second estimates revealed evidence for psychologically distinct geographical subregions that were coordinated, in an ordinal sense, across the Atlantic Ocean.Further, the second estimates were affected by the nature of the physical adjacency between regions (e.g., the southern U.S. and Mexico) and by accurate location information about distant, but coordinated, subregions (e.g., the southern U.S. and Mediterranean Europe).The data provide support for a framework for making geographical estimates in which people strike a balance between 2 principles: the need to keep their knowledge base coherent, and the inertial tendency to resist changing the knowledge base unless it is necessary to maintain coherence.People acquire knowledge about the world across the lifespan.This simple fact implies that new knowledge is acquired in the context of prior knowledge and that the content, and perhaps the structure, of the knowledge base changes to reflect this learning.Obviously, the capacity to integrate new knowledge with old is an extremely important one, for without it, we could not adapt to the changing physical, social, and intellectual environment.Yet little is known about how newly acquired facts affect our understanding in complex, real-world domains.The present study was motivated by an interest in this issue, and it represents an attempt to identify principles that determine how and when knowledge changes in response to new information.Specifically, we argue that two principles---coherence and inertia--play a central role in determining how people update real-world knowledge.We present two experiments that use a seeding procedure (Brown & Siegler, 1993, 1996;Friedman & Brown, 2000), in which people are given location information about a small number of cities, to demonstrate these principles at work.In both experiments, participants first estimated the latitude of a set of cities.Then they learned the actual latitudes of two cities and provided a second set of estimates.The comparison between the first and second estimates provides the basis for inferences about the psychological principles and processes underlying the integration of new information with prior knowledge.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.458
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.048
GPT teacher head0.399
Teacher spread0.351 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it