Bibliographic record
Abstract
Governmental systems are one of the significant topics of constitutional law literature and comprehensive studies have been carried out on this issue.The answer to the question whether a parliamentary system, a presidential system or a mixed system is the most suitable system of government can change according to the political preferences of the countries.Since countries search for the best system of government, debate about "governmental system change" keep its actuality.(Note 1) Discussions about governmental system change are also not new in Turkey.Parliamentarism has been one of the defining characteristics of the Turkish constitutional system since 1876 Ottoman Constitution; however, during the application of the Constitution of 1982 first ex-president Turgut Özal, then ex-president Süleyman Demirel maintained that the governmental system in Turkey needed to be changed from parliamentary system to semi-presidential or presidential system, because Turkey's growing and pressing problems require an "effective executive" which would take necessary decisions quickly and apply them effectively and the president in such systems fits this requirement.Governmental system change issue also came into question during the The Justice and Development Party Government's term of office.Both the prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself and the other senior party members occasionally mentioned that semi-presidential system would be the best governmental system for Turkey (Öder, 2005, p.31; Gönenç, 2008, p.522; Caniklioğlu, 1999, p.184-186; Yavuz, 2000, p.544-556; TBMMTD, 1999, p.28).The crucial constitutional amendment which was accepted through a nationwide referendum on 21 October 2007, overshadowed the discussions about governmental systems in Turkey for awhile.The amendment in question changed the Turkish Governmental System from parliamentary system to parliamentary with "president" system by introducing the principle of "popular election of the president".(Note 2) Moreover, the new system is being considered as a step to pass through a semi-presidential or a presidential system in Turkey.Some academicians think that the adoption of the principle of popular election of the president was not the consequence of the discussions about a transition from the parliamentary system to a presidential or a semi-presidential system among political and academic circles.In fact, it was a reaction to a political crisis related to the election of the President by Turkish Parliament, therefore it is difficult to accept this amendment as a well designed constitutional engineering scheme and the new governmental system could create serious problems in the future.(Note 3) In this article, the political crisis as the main reason of the last constitutional amendment in Turkey which introduced the principle of popular election of the president by parliament will be summarized and the prospective problems that would arise from the new governmental system will be discussed.The debates of whether the presidential or semi-presidential system is the most suitable option for Turkey or not will also be reviewed.We believe that summarizing the process before the last amendment would be illuminative to comprehend the reason for making the amendment in question.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.004 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.010 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.165 | 0.070 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".