The Rise of “Internet of Things”: Review and Open Research Issues Related to Detection and Prevention of IoT‐Based Security Attacks
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper provides an extensive and complete survey on the process of detecting and preventing various types of IoT‐based security attacks. It is designed for software developers, researchers, and practitioners in the Internet of Things field who aim to understand the process of detecting and preventing these attacks. For each entry identified from the list, a brief description is provided along with references where more information can be found. However, We surveyed the current state‐of‐the‐art IoT security solutions and focused on four main aspects: (1) handpicking representative attacks, (2) identifying potential solutions, (3) performing a threat analysis for each attack and solution, and (4) ranking solutions according to the threats they overcome. By adopting this framework, we identified five main categories of defense mechanisms: distributed denial of service detection/prevention, default password protection, encryption mechanisms, intrusion detection/prevention, and anomaly detection. These solutions are relatively mature in terms of utility and usability. However, the security analysis is conducted only concerning specific attacks, which may or may not be relevant to real‐world deployment. Appropriate IoT security solutions should incorporate threat modeling while considering other factors such as resource consumption and implementation effort. Overall, evaluation of IoT security solutions is arduous due to the complexity of IoT OSes, heterogeneous IoT devices (e.g., various hardware platforms), limited availability of open‐source codebases, and restrictive policies towards intellectual property disclosure. In addition, we note that there remains a lack of studies that perform a systematic evaluation of the state‐of‐the‐art in terms of both frameworks/methodologies and mechanisms proposed.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.005 | 0.007 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".