APPROACHES TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES: BETWEEN DETENTION AND CORRECTION
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
In the article approaches to ensuring compliance with international environmental agreements are considered. It is determined that in international law there are two main approaches to ensuring compliance with treaties and the obligations arising from them: facilitative or incentive and coercive, which correspond to non-confrontational and confrontational means of responding to violations. International environmental law gives preference to the facilitative approach since it shows itself more attractive for states that are often afraid of serious sanctions and other negative consequences of non-compliance with treaties. Moreover, the facilitative approach really helps developing states technically and financially to fulfill their obligations under multilateral environmental agreements. The most famous and successful example of them is the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985. At the same time, a number of treaties are characterized by confrontational measures that are really necessary in the cases of voluntary non-compliance. The example of the latter is the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, which has not proved itself efficient enough. The author emphasizes the need to combine two approaches in developing a procedure for ensuring compliance with international environmental agreements, taking into account the object and purposes of an agreement. On the one hand, it will give the parties more possibilities for voluntary compliance and, on the other hand, will stimulate them to do so by the risk of enforcement. The appropriate combination should be supported by effective means and methods of international verification and be manifested in the functions of compliance bodies. Hopefully the Paris Agreement of 2015 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 will show itself a successful instance of such an approach.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it