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Record W4308642527 · doi:10.1145/3548606.3563535

Poster

2022· article· en· W4308642527 on OpenAlexaff
Yingao Elaine Yao, Pritam Dash, Karthik Pattabiraman

Bibliographic record

VenueProceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · 2022
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicDistributed Control Multi-Agent Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
Fundersnot available
KeywordsDroneSpoofing attackSwarm behaviourComputer scienceCrashExploitArtificial intelligenceComputer securitySwarm robotics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Swarm robotics, particularly drone swarms, are used in various safety-critical tasks. While a lot of attention has been paid to improving swarm control algorithms for improved intelligence, the security implications of various design choices in swarm control algorithms have not been studied. We highlight how an attacker can exploit the vulnerabilities in swarm control algorithms to disrupt drone swarms. Specifically, we show that the attacker can target one swarm member (target drone) through sensor spoofing attacks, and indirectly cause other swarm members (victim drones) to veer off from their course, and potentially resulting in a crash. Our attack cannot be prevented by traditional software security techniques, and it is stealthy in nature as it causes seemingly benign deviations in drone swarms. Our initial results show that spoofing the position of a target drone by 5m is sufficient to cause other drones to crash into a front obstacle. Overall, our attack achieves 76.67% and 93.33% success rate with 5m and 10m spoofing deviation respectively.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.003
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: Not applicable
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.321
Threshold uncertainty score0.000

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.003
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.001
Scholarly communication0.0050.004
Open science0.0020.004
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.6790.474

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.033
GPT teacher head0.256
Teacher spread0.223 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations8
Published2022
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

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