Law, Economics, and Privacy: Implications of Government Policies on Website and Third-Party Information Sharing
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Widespread abuse of internet users' privacy online has prompted user advocacy groups to implore governments to intervene and protect consumer rights. To study such interventions' effects, we examine data-protection policies that policy makers and governments can enforce on websites, including consent-based user information sharing and subsidizing competing websites. Interestingly, we find that even though a consent-based policy may improve user surplus, it has the unintended consequence of increasing the number of third-parties and, thus, sharing of user information. We also determine that both consent-based and website subsidization policies may reduce competition by driving websites out of the market—to the detriment of user surplus and social welfare. Moreover, consent-based policies are not beneficial to websites, but are beneficial for third-parties. Policy makers should consider the different policy mechanisms at their disposal. Website subsidization is similar to a scalpel, enabling them to sculpt around and impact specific target markets. Consent-based policies are more comparable to a sledgehammer that uniformly affects all market segments. For circumstances where it is difficult for the government to enact a law for the entire market, website subsidization policies may be appealing alternatives, as they may yield higher user surplus than consent-based policies.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it