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Record W4372324534 · doi:10.54691/bcpbm.v44i.4977

Application of Nash Equilibrium: Taking the Game Between Enterprises as an Example

2023· article· en· W4372324534 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueBCP Business & Management · 2023
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicGame Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Ottawa
Fundersnot available
KeywordsNash equilibriumMathematical economicsEpsilon-equilibriumEquilibrium selectionSolution conceptBest responseGame theoryComputer scienceSymmetric equilibriumRepeated gameEconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The game theory of microeconomics is one of the important analysis and decision-making tools for managing enterprises. Von Neumann discusses the zero-sum game of two people, while Nash discusses a broader range of games. This paper aims to explore the important concept of Nash Equilibrium in game theory. With the wide application of Nash Equilibrium in different fields such as economics, politics, psychology and machine learning, it is becoming increasingly important to understand and apply Nash Equilibrium. The author first introduces the concept and mathematical definition of Nash Equilibrium, and then takes the "Prisoner's Dilemma" game as an example to elaborate its application methods and significance in detail. Subsequently, the author discusses the limitations of Nash Equilibrium, including the inability to guarantee the maximum profit, and proposes corresponding solutions. Finally, the author explores the applications of Nash Equilibrium in different fields, as well as the prospects in machine learning and artificial intelligence fields.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.966
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.003
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.162
GPT teacher head0.395
Teacher spread0.233 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it