A Survey of Privacy Risks and Mitigation Strategies in the Artificial Intelligence Life Cycle
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Over the decades, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning has become a transformative solution in many sectors, services, and technology platforms in a wide range of applications, such as in smart healthcare, financial, political, and surveillance systems. In such applications, a large amount of data is generated about diverse aspects of our life. Although utilizing AI in real-world applications provides numerous opportunities for societies and industries, it raises concerns regarding data privacy. Data used in an AI system are cleaned, integrated, and processed throughout the AI life cycle. Each of these stages can introduce unique threats to individual’s privacy and have an impact on ethical processing and protection of data. In this paper, we examine privacy risks in different phases of the AI life cycle and review the existing privacy-enhancing solutions. We introduce four different categories of privacy risk, including (i) risk of identification, (ii) risk of making an inaccurate decision, (iii) risk of non-transparency in AI systems, and (iv) risk of non-compliance with privacy regulations and best practices. We then examined the potential privacy risks in each AI life cycle phase, evaluated concerns, and reviewed privacy-enhancing technologies, requirements, and process solutions to countermeasure these risks. We also reviewed some of the existing privacy protection policies and the need for compliance with available privacy regulations in AI-based systems. The main contribution of this survey is examining privacy challenges and solutions, including technology, process, and privacy legislation in the entire AI life cycle. In each phase of the AI life cycle, open challenges have been identified.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.014 | 0.029 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.005 | 0.006 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.007 | 0.012 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".