Data Poisoning Attacks and Defenses to LDP-Based Privacy-Preserving Crowdsensing
Bibliographic record
Abstract
In this paper, we explore data poisoning attacks and their defenses in local differential privacy (LDP)-based crowdsensing systems. First, we construct data poisoning attacks launched by corrupted workers to subvert crowdsensing results by tampering information reported. Specifically, the attacks are formulated as a bi-level optimization problem where attackers strive to conceal their malicious behavior by delicately exploiting noise perturbation introduced by LDP protocols. In this way, the attacks can not be detected, even with the weight-based truth discovery methods. Due to the NP-hard nature of the bi-level problem, we decompose it into upper-level and lower-level sub-problems and employ the augmented Lagrangian method to iteratively solve them, ultimately identifying optimal attack strategies. Second, we propose corresponding countermeasures to defend against the attacks. The countermeasures are formulated as a minimization problem, with the objective of minimizing disruptions caused by attacks through the identification and removal of corrupted workers from crowdsensing systems. To solve the problem, we utilize a differential evolution algorithm instead of gradient-based methods since the objective function of the problem is not differentiable. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets are conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed attacks and defenses. The evaluation results demonstrate that LDP perturbation indeed facilitates the success of data poisoning attacks, and the proposed defenses can accurately distinguish malicious behaviors disguised.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.013 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".