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Record W4394724517 · doi:10.1111/corg.12582

Lead Independent Directors and Internal Information Environment

2024· article· en· W4394724517 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueCorporate Governance An International Review · 2024
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicCorporate Finance and Governance
Canadian institutionsSaint Mary's University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBusinessLead (geology)AccountingCorporate governanceFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

ABSTRACT Research Question/Issue This study explores the relationship between the presence of a lead independent director (LID) and firms' internal information environment. LIDs are elected independent members of the board who perform key duties for the independent directors and the board, including reviewing and approving board meeting agendas, chairing non‐executive board meetings, and acting as a liaison between the CEO and other independent directors. We hypothesize that LID presence lowers information barriers between the CEO and the rest of the board members, enabling more rapid information acquisition and integration and enhancing the internal information environment of the firm. Research Findings/Insights Using a sample of US publicly listed companies from 2001 to 2019, we document that LID presence on the board is positively associated with proxies of internal information quality that reflect better information acquisition and information integration: accuracy and precision of management earnings forecasts, speed of earnings announcement, and absence of material weaknesses in internal controls. These results are robust to alternative model specifications, including entropy balancing, Heckman two‐step correction for self‐selection bias, firm fixed effects, and placebo tests. Further analyses suggest that LIDs with financial expertise and audit committee memberships are more effective in positively influencing internal information quality. We also show that LID presence is positively associated with several proxies of external information quality. Theoretical/Academic Implications We build on agency theory to argue that LIDs improve internal information quality by reinforcing the information quality benefits of unified leadership while mitigating potential compromises in information quality arising from entrenchment. Similarly, we use arguments emanating from the novel strategic leadership systems theory to posit that a LID appointment facilitates the tasks of the CEO and the board, enhancing the effectiveness of both groups in their respective roles: the CEO in making operating and investment decisions and the board in strengthening oversight while bringing cohesion in their shared role of strategy visioning and implementation. Practitioner/Policy Implications Our findings suggest that there is scope for shareholders to consider LID appointments as an addition to their firms' corporate governance structures to enhance the internal information environment and decision‐making efficiency. Policymakers can also encourage LID appointments on the board when promoting best practices in corporate governance through regulatory guidelines.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.742
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.007
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.025
GPT teacher head0.234
Teacher spread0.209 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it