A Usable Encryption Solution for File-Based Geospatial Data within a Database File System
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Developing a security solution for spatial files within today’s enterprise Geographical Information System (GIS) that is also usable presents a multifaceted challenge. These files exist in “data silos” of different file server types, resulting in limited collaboration and increased vulnerability. While cloud-based data storage offers many benefits, the associated security concerns have limited its uptake in GIS, making it crucial to explore comparable alternative security solutions that can be deployed on-premise and are also usable. This paper introduces a reasonably usable security solution for spatial files within collaborative enterprise GIS. We explore a Database File System (DBFS) as a potential repository to consolidate and manage spatial files based on its enterprise document management capabilities and security features inherited from the underlying legacy DBMS. These files are protected using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm with practical encryption times of 8 MB per second. The final part focuses on an automated encryption solution with schemes for single- and multi-user files that is compatible with various GIS programs and protocol services. Usability testing is carried out to assess the solution’s usability and focuses on effectiveness, efficiency, and user satisfaction, with the results demonstrating its usability based on the minimal changes it makes to how users work in a collaborative enterprise GIS environment. The solution furnishes a viable means for consolidating and protecting spatial files with various formats at the storage layer within enterprise GIS.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".