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Record W4403100288 · doi:10.9734/jerr/2024/v26i101291

Protecting Autonomous UAVs from GPS Spoofing and Jamming: A Comparative Analysis of Detection and Mitigation Techniques

2024· article· en· W4403100288 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Engineering Research and Reports · 2024
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEngineering
TopicAutomated Road and Building Extraction
Canadian institutionsCentennial College
Fundersnot available
KeywordsSpoofing attackGlobal Positioning SystemComputer scienceJammingReal-time computingGPS signalsArtificial intelligenceAssisted GPSComputer securityTelecommunications

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This study investigates the vulnerabilities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to GPS spoofing and jamming, addressing three key research questions: (1) What are the common techniques used to spoof or jam GPS signals for UAVs? (2) How do these techniques impact UAV performance and safety? (3) What mitigation strategies are most effective in preventing interference? A mixed-methods approach was used, combining a qualitative review of peer-reviewed literature and a quantitative analysis of GPS signal data. Spoofing increased positioning errors to 20.45 meters, while jamming reduced mission completion rates by 40%. Detection models, including Random Forest, SVM, and Neural Networks, were evaluated, with SVM showing a recall of 56.4% for spoofed signals despite lower overall accuracy. Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and Visual Odometry were most effective in reducing navigation errors by over 90% and showed the highest mission success rates, recovering from interference within 0.81 to 1.28 seconds. These findings highlight the importance of integrating advanced detection methods and resilient systems in GPS-reliant UAV operations.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Bench or experimental · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.600
Threshold uncertainty score0.298

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.022
GPT teacher head0.309
Teacher spread0.287 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it