Shilling Attacks and Fake Reviews Injection: Principles, Models, and Datasets
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Recommendation systems have proved to be a compelling performance in overcoming the data overload problem in many domains, such as e-commerce, e-health, and transportation. Recommender systems guide users/clients to personalized recommendations based on their preferences. However, some recommendation systems are vulnerable to shilling attacks, which create rating biases or fake reviews that will eventually affect the authenticity and integrity of the generated recommendations. This survey comprehensively covers various shilling attack methods, including high-knowledge, low-knowledge attacks, and obfuscated attacks. It explores malicious review generators that generate fake text. In addition to that, this survey covers shilling attack detection methods such as supervised, unsupervised, semisupervised, and hybrid techniques. Natural Language Processing techniques are also thoroughly explored for fake text review detection using large language models (LLMs). A wide range of detection mechanisms incorporated in the literature is examined, such as convolutional neural network (CNN), long short term memory (LSTM)-based detectors for rating-based shilling attacks, and bidirectional encoder representation (BERT) and RoBERTa-based detectors for fake reviews that are accompanied by shilling attacks, aiming to offer insights into the evolving methods of shilling attack strategies and the corresponding advancements in the detection methods.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it