Are Social Imaginaries Immune to Ideology Critique?

Over the past few decades, the terms “social imaginary” and “political imaginary” have become increasingly widespread in mainstream political theory.1 Coined by Cornelius Castoriadis and reformulated by Charles Taylor, the category of the social imaginary was contrived to capture a domain of practical and implicit meaning of social action. For better or worse, it has since come to supplement and sometimes eclipse the more traditional concepts of ideology and utopia in contemporary cultural analysis2. Thus, in the political diagnoses of our cultural and historical moment, one finds innumerable references to collective imaginaries. For instance, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe speak of “Marxist” imaginaries, the “political imaginary of Western societies,” the “democratic imaginary,” the “egalitarian imaginary,” and the “political imaginary of the Left” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 2, 4, 152, 155, 158–179, 160, 167, 177, 190). In these uses, the idea of an imaginary is associated with diverse entities: a geopolitical and historical referent (Western modernity), a theoretical tradition and political movement (Marxism), a form of government (democracy), a bundle of normative ideas (egalitarianism), and so on. Imaginaries have continued to proliferate. Fischer (2004, 107, 155, 157, 190, 270, 146, 152, 156, 192) mentions the “antislavery imaginary,” the “indigenist imaginary,” the “national imaginary,” the “Eurocentric imaginary.” Pippin (2010, 16) and Philips (2022) both refer to the “American imaginary.” Fraser (2013, 1–4, 9, 12, 16, 190) speaks of the “feminist imaginary,” the “neoliberal imaginary,” the “Westphalian,” and the “socialist imaginary.” Mignolo (2001) refers to the “imaginary of the modern/colonial world,” Bell (2013, 539) to the “imperial imaginary,” Weeks (2011) to “postwork imaginaries,” Hartman (2020) and Chua (2020) to the “abolitionist imaginary,” and Chamoiseau (1998, 2000, 2002) has coined the expression “warrior of the imaginary,” figuring the imaginary as a battleground of cultural politics. This burgeoning use of “imaginary” is a symptom of our historical moment, mediated as it is, by the decline of mass politics, the desiccation of utopian projects, the rise of neoliberal modes of rationality and mechanisms of government, new information and cultural technologies, and so on. These broader historical shifts have gone hand in hand with a renewed focus, in social theory, on non-cognitivist paradigms that center, broadly speaking, on bodies and practices rather than on ideas with propositional content. In this paper, I want to examine one dimension of this trend, namely, what form of critique is appropriate for collective imaginaries. In contemporary political and social theory, the rise of the category of the imaginary has coincided with a decline of ideology as a social-theoretical concept. I am not postulating a causal relation between these two phenomena—the decline of the concept of ideology is tied, among other things, to the historical trajectories of Marxism as a theoretical and political project, to the increasing criticism of the theory of ideology by Marxist and non-Marxist scholarship alike, and to the repudiation of grand narratives and “objective” forms of analysis in the humanities and the social sciences. Yet even if there is no causal connection between the rise of “imaginary” and the decline of “ideology,” these two developments have been contemporaneous over the past four decades or so. They are connected, insofar as imaginary is often used to refer to phenomena of social life that exist because we collectively take them for granted. In this regard, it is symptomatic that several recent attempts to defend and recast the concept of ideology have either explicitly drawn on the language of imaginary or have reformulated the concept of ideology in such a way that it approximates what other scholars have called a social imaginary. This is especially the case for theories that draw on the tradition that goes from Gramsci to Althusser, for whom any ideology, to be effective, must be validated by everyday life.3 If “imaginary” is to be understood not simply as a synonym for “ideology” but rather as a potential theoretical alternative to it, then this raises the question of critique. Succinctly put, the Marxist tradition and the tradition of critical theory (in its Frankfurt variations and beyond) have developed an entire instrumentarium for the purpose of ideology critique. Do these approaches to ideology critique have any traction on imaginaries? Can the category of the social imaginary be a central concept in a critical theory of society? And does the answer to this question hinge on whether it is possible to criticize a social imaginary? Before we get into the discussion of the imaginary, let me briefly define what I mean by “ideology” and “critique,” two terms that are employed in many different senses.4 Because my aim here is to work out what form of critique is appropriate for social imaginaries, and since this requires sharpening the contours between ideology and social imaginaries my definitions are somewhat orthodox in character: I use “ideology” to refer to patterns of social meanings, values, and ideas that are in some respect false, distorted, misdirected, or impoverished.5 This concept of ideology is explicitly normative, in the sense that it treats ideology as a pro tanto bad. It rejects both the positivist reduction of ideology to individual “biases” or “prejudices” as is common in psychological and sociological research and the expansive concept of ideology that derives from the sociology of knowledge, according to which all ideas and worldviews are ideological.6 Geuss (1981, 13–22) helpfully distinguishes three different senses of ideological distortion: ideas or forms of consciousness may be distorted in virtue of (1) epistemic properties, (2) functional properties, or (3) genetic properties. A detailed discussion of these different types of distortion exceeds the scope of this paper, but I want to briefly offer some examples for each. Good specimens of epistemically false beliefs are ones that confuse a social for a natural phenomenon, for instance, to regard institutions such as markets or the late modern nuclear family form as natural givens rather than historically contingent social constructs (Geuss 1981, 14). Another example of an epistemically false belief is one that is self-fulfilling, so a belief whose contents are only true if the agent believes them.7 Examples for functional distortions might include beliefs or practices that stabilize or legitimize reprehensible institutions or unjust practices, for example, the belief that, in the face of the overwhelming power of the ruling class, resignation is the only available option. Here, it is immaterial if the belief is epistemically true or false; what matters is that the belief functionally sustains the power of the ruling class because it inhibits resistance. Finally, examples for genetic distortions include sets of beliefs that agents hold because of their social position (e.g., their class position). Here, it is neither the epistemic or functional status of the belief that is distorted but the process, cause, or motivations that lead agents to hold that belief. While it may well be the case that social imaginaries suffer from each of these types of distortions, for the remainder of this paper I will set aside the genetic type, a proper discussion of which would take us too far afield.8 In my understanding, ideological distortion is therefore either epistemic or functional. This double specification of distortion allows us to ask whether imaginaries are susceptible to either of these dimensions. In describing the different shapes distortion takes, I have used Geuss's language of “beliefs,” “ideas,” and “consciousness,” which is how the content of ideology has conventionally been understood in the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory.9 But as we shall see, the crux of social imaginaries is precisely that not in such and propositional “critique,” I mean the theoretical to on the of knowledge, and to in modern by the and of social and cultural practices and ideas but by their by social This is more expansive than some (e.g., of in which and are And it is than to two of critique that I regard as the by positivist social and some of (e.g., and of critique from criticism (e.g., It is to both for the of that has been the of critical theory, for forms of cultural and for of and critique as well as critique In this paper, I am in the question of critique because of the that imaginaries to this of critique. I set aside alternative approaches to critique not because I them but because there are that the category of the imaginary to critique that not to other these is an concept. A central of critical Geuss's of the critical theory of (Geuss 1981, to have of its A that not in its form and but and political theory is increasingly from And the to the of critique have so far to offer social-theoretical concepts or that have both and to a or is a collective the social theoretical collective imaginaries to social meanings, are in a and in some way to the But this is as far as the the content of “imaginary” as with in a a of such as or sometimes for the of the concept is that it refers to such as and as well as cultural and all of which from and on whether the content of the imaginary is or we get two one “imaginary” refers to and beliefs that we hold and one “imaginary” refers to and beliefs that we hold which we may well Thus, a collective imaginary be understood as either of and example, a or imaginary that is by social it be understood as the of implicit meanings, and social ones that are such as and the collective imaginary that we that we we to or the between that which we take for and that which we If imaginaries are and then not from of ideology and any to critique that is to imaginaries for the purpose of this paper, I will a of imaginaries, the one by Charles to (2004, the imaginary refers to their social how with how on between them and their the that are and the normative and that these For Taylor, an imaginary of social that are both and collective and that a of social which is an is that social imaginaries are not ideas but social forms into which ideas have over They are the of and developments ideas and that are take on and in practices, and social in an imaginary of the everyday that have of each the of in practices and social of which we are only Because the social imaginary is not it a of social that is, the and that possible and collective social It an of social which the form not of a but of of the social For example, the social imaginary the question of whom we how and with whom we might a an as well as the of political the and in a and so on. imaginary these and in the form of common a form of practical that does not have the of a belief or an precisely because we may have it in the define the imaginary as a of meaning and as a set of may be but a for critique. imaginaries, in are normative They values, such as between virtue and of the what is and what is and and and They are of of social practices and of for This may not be we the imaginary as the way one on a or on a Yet even in these the imaginary of social that cultural and values, ideas and and imaginaries are the of that a critical theory of must Yet the on or as to may for the critique of imaginaries. 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If theories a social imaginary and are this a between the of a and its form of critique this possible on the between and and their It and these for example, to social or to which have not been take a contemporary example, the of the normative for such as for and and the of this of it is briefly the and on which critique critique is on the that the between and or belief and requires a set of that must be to is to critique is not the of a of on a domain of but rather a For critique the of that is, an into the and of into the that must critical no the but its This of critique is for and for of this in the to that not the but only want to the new criticism of the In this rejects theoretical approaches that normative to and a form of its from the social it of critique what it from is that it the of It does not simply a set of normative but derives these from that are in social of critique is to the in social between social forms and their of is on the that the is that the is the but in a form that has to For critical theory, this of as a of social forms of and the in which the for a critique of the imaginary, is whether such a is Can critique what would have called the or the of an imaginary, even if that content in a false does a critique of imaginaries have to on this this we must be the of ideology critique. While this critique the of it is a critique of critique its critical traction from the relation between an or a form of consciousness on the one hand and social institutions and practices on the other of ideology critique is that the social or political (e.g., in ideology be and are therefore in with the forms of social For the critique of social imaginaries, this that to the that it is possible to and or in a social imaginary, it be to the of critique. such or is it is to on what an imaginary be as In the imaginary, a set of and are with a set of and between virtue and of the of what is and what is and and and so on. It is this of and that the imaginary such a hinge in social Yet this raises the question on what an imaginary be as false or distorted, a of and an their their position in that that their and so on. the of of false the language of the of by a or on and that of in practices that the of and is from ideological insofar as it is not a of to false beliefs but rather by the that and distortion of in a of that from their for it is how imaginaries to practices to social If imaginaries are to be more than of cultural that the social how are in social practices and in the social This is a social-theoretical that from the of theories of social imaginaries. imaginaries of practices and their or Do social practices or from them This is not an for example, that forms of life are even are of practices allows to of practices as is that them as and and as in practices of but are a it is possible to for whether practices are the If the social imaginary is to be understood as a social-theoretical its relation to practices and social must be it is to the between the content of the that is a set of or and practical the one and the social on the the ideas and in social imaginaries are not in and terms but rather in practices, and the normative of the instance, the to individual and which be to critique by to their and content of an imaginary is not A social imaginary not propositional that beliefs or ideas but and as well as such as and such practical mechanisms and to it, the that be for is precisely that we not of it, that is, that we have no of how common sense is (1981, practical a of and on the that propositional or of how practices are their This does not mean that is but that explicitly and such its If this epistemic to the imaginary, it that imaginaries may not be imaginaries and that a of to their content susceptible to If this is then the form of the social imaginary may social practices and cultural criticism by them common sense has as its that is to it a to in terms of the and the that this content is or it must be and into form to it to I take to these to be that critique be critique derives its normative from social it does not these to a is because it would both a position the imaginary and a to practical meaning into a of both of these which is such a of is not available on It is not that that imaginaries and that such and but of this a is in the of more to shifts than to the cultural we might with the of But the with this position is that it the scope of critique to that which is in an In of a social and political only if it with the in an imaginary it for Taylor, is only to shifts because the ideas in an imaginary will and Yet the with such a is that it to be and neither for social that of the social imaginary is to the of a status Yet this that there is in theory that on two examples from the of are by no the status They may as and But the two examples for the potential of a social imaginary in the be both the in the and the in Yet both and the of a a of government of the of would be a more if from a social imaginary, might that draw on knowledge, implicit of social and a social movement that does not the examples of the in and the in only work if we that the political and so an and content. this simply be for we the by the far which sometimes the as the ones by the in and of and have been not only by and but by several and that have to them as for and of such as a for an or politics. is the question of our social imaginaries distorted or While that imaginaries are to that, ideology, which as and imaginaries are and therefore false Yet this to be a and a of epistemic and properties. of an ideology does not that it is therefore or And to a consciousness or a set of practices as distorted does not it from of the the idea that are false is an widespread but of ideology critique. 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But the of this is that not set of ideas in a is that of example, the ideology of not as A of is not an ideology on because it be is a of and ideology is of ideology with its For the critique of ideology to get the it must be to draw on a ideology, in other that is true and that is This sets a on what as If ideology has no of or its content does not in some way the social and historical of a or some it is speaking, ideology but ideas are not ideology on because the and rationality of ideology, and even as are not They are used and for the of This of them for the of that is in ideology critique. If the false ideas that are not then what their power and this is a and that the of such false ideas derives from the that These are worldviews that are from by a and their power from the aside whether this is an theory of what is analysis is that that such ideas must be to a different of critique than the critique of of what is in this is a sociological and analysis of how these ideas what of and what and to and modern that are susceptible to this of In that what is is not its content but its is the and of these are the social and by late modern that them it in the content of ideas is its form is in the sense of the of in modern If is then it out that ideology is a more than we might have and one that has of It requires both a of power and a of that are contingent and and power are and are to forms of that not the category of the traditional of ideology is to and the forms of power and in an social imaginaries may forms of distortion that are not ideological in a traditional does this mean for social imaginaries? social imaginaries be to ideology critique if it is possible to in them the of of and that is of In this regard, and to the that their content be and in are no different than any other cultural imaginaries to the that their form describing and their content in terms of true and This might be the case if imaginaries have more of an rather than of and rather content. It is these that a different of critique. If the form of imaginaries is such that be into true and false, if imaginaries have the to us and our and the then we must ask what the of the distortion is that imaginaries possible distortion might in the and that If social imaginaries of that we take for one of the for critique might be how the of this is and what it This is a question that has no answer for all imaginaries. into how imaginaries will different on the imaginary But what imaginaries have in common is that the of by which are and Imaginaries not only a a social I use the here in a sense to refer to a domain of what with I as a and social and are by such a of which may from to and in diverse If social imaginaries have a and if the social of that is to social and them from the of social and then we that social imaginaries to by virtue of their institutions and be from ideological an idea that has been central to the tradition of ideology the purpose of is to the of a social is a social imaginaries not but a of such is by no or But it be as a form of distortion because the of by the social imaginary social practices from and critique. distortion by practices and institutions requires a different to one that to the forms of that what we take for granted. must the of that social imaginaries by practices and must therefore precisely this and an has been by defend a of critique their only a historical and genetic research that the in of power and of our practices, of and to here not be understood as an of that the and of social practices and critique has the to the and that we take for granted. It does so by the everyday and its of the of is and and the form of While these and are not an ideology critique in the the of social life social imaginaries are In social imaginaries not distortion and to social by practices, and even institutions While social imaginaries are not to ideology many imaginaries not the of such critique. For ideology it does not that a of social meaning and practices be distorted and functionally to social For critique to get the it must be possible to a of in this For social imaginaries, critique is more both because it is in terms of the content of its and because it the of with which social imaginaries the of with a of I the of this and for their on an

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