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Record W4412736476 · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2025.07.048

Subsidizing a new technology: An impulse Stackelberg game approach

2025· article· en· W4412736476 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.
fundA Canadian funder is recorded on the work.

Bibliographic record

VenueEuropean Journal of Operational Research · 2025
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicInnovation Diffusion and Forecasting
Canadian institutionsHEC MontréalGroup for Research in Decision Analysis
FundersNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
KeywordsStackelberg competitionSubsidyComputer scienceImpulse (physics)Game theoryMathematical optimizationMathematical economicsOperations researchEconomicsMathematicsMarket economy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Governments are motivated to subsidize profit-driven firms that manufacture zero-emission vehicles to ensure they become price-competitive. This paper introduces a dynamic Stackelberg game to determine the government’s optimal subsidy strategy for zero-emission vehicles, taking into account the pricing decisions of a profit-maximizing firm. While firms have the flexibility to change prices continuously, subsidies are adjusted at specific time intervals. This is captured in our game formulation by using impulse controls for discrete-time interventions. We provide a verification theorem to characterize the Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium and illustrate our results with numerical experiments.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.026
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.013
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMetaresearch
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.679
Threshold uncertainty score0.995

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0260.013
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0030.004
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.001
Open science0.0020.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.311
GPT teacher head0.490
Teacher spread0.179 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it