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Record W4938301

Public Participation, Federalism and Environmental Law

2009· article· en· W4938301 on OpenAlexaffabout
Andrew James Green

Bibliographic record

VenueeYLS (Yale Law School) · 2009
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicRegulation and Compliance Studies
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsEnvironmental lawPublic participationPublic interestPublic economicsLeaseBusinessPublic policyPolitical scienceEconomicsPublic administrationLaw and economicsLaw
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

To the surprise of many Canadians, environmental regulation in Canada has been much less stringent than that in the U.S. since at least the 1970s. The principal reason given for this difference in stringency has been the process by which environmental law has been formulated. Canadian environmental law has typically been made in a very closed and informal fashion, providing industry with considerable power to influence policy but denying the public significant access to policy-makers. In the U.S. the system has been much more open and formal and provides greater opportunities for public participation. This rationale has lead to an increase in public participation rights in the environmental area in Canada. This paper examines the potential effect of increasing public participation rights. Such rights should result in greater information to and pressure on policy-makers. However, as such rights tend to lower costs of access for both the public and for regulated parties, it is not immediately clear how they will affect the relative stringency of environmental law. A factor which has greater impact on the ability of the public or public interest groups to act is the (increasingly) de-centralized nature of environmental regulation in Canada relative to the U.S. This tends to decrease the relative power of public interest groups to apply pressure on legislators by increasing their costs of action, reducing the ability of regulators to deal with extra-territorial effects and increasing the relative power of industry. In addition, while there has been an increase in public participation in Canada, it is not an unquestionable benefit in all cases. The public and regulators may have different views of environmental priorities. These differences may be due to either public attention to qualitative aspects of risk which are not apparent to regulators or to "rationality" problems of the public in perceiving relative risks. As a result, to the extent that increased public participation in Canada in the formulation of environmental law leads to regulation based on "irrationalities" by the public, such increase may actually lead to less optimal environmental regulation. A new institutional structure may be required to mitigate such concerns.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.007
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.323
Threshold uncertainty score0.643

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.007
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0090.021
Scholarly communication0.0060.004
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0060.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0110.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.032
GPT teacher head0.238
Teacher spread0.206 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations18
Published2009
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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