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Record W591993527

A New Blueprint for Ontario's Electricity Market

2013· article· en· W591993527 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueC.D. Howe Institute Commentary · 2013
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicCanadian Policy and Governance
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsTransparency (behavior)Government (linguistics)BusinessBlueprintPrivate sectorElectricity marketInvestment (military)Market powerElectricityIndustrial organizationEconomicsMarket economyMonopolyEconomic growthEngineering
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

An ongoing challenge for power markets worldwide is to assure sufficient continued investment to maintain reliability. A properly designed capacity market – in which plants receive payment for available supply capacity whether or not the power generator runs – may enable Ontario to increase reliance on market signals for new investment. To be effective, the government must pair building a capacity market with several changes in the role and function of existing Ontario power market institutions. The government should isolate policymakers from implementation agencies. The Ontario power sector today has oversupply, a mismatch of generator capabilities and needs, rising prices to final consumers, a lack of transparency in prices, and volatile and contradictory policies. Consequently, private-sector actors are unable to justify investment without some form of government-backed contract. The government’s failure to rely on either sound planning or market principles has meant that the province has not procured generation capacity at a long-run least cost. Current surplus supply conditions provide a window for thoughtful policy review. The government should establish a market that sends transparent and effective price signals of the need for new electricity generation capacity. Doing so first requires creating appropriate buffers between implementation entities and policymakers, meaning that the government should not use ministerial directives to interfere with the day-to-day operation of key power sector institutions. It also requires that the province replace the Ontario Power Authority’s principal buyer role with newly created supply entities.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: Not applicable
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.312
Threshold uncertainty score0.998

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0030.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.023
GPT teacher head0.273
Teacher spread0.250 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it