Bibliographic record
Abstract
The splitting up of nuclear utility British Energy has begun. On February 14, the utility completed the sale of its Canadian joint venture, Bruce Power. It now has until June 30 to dispose of its 50 % interest in Amergen, which owns three US reactors. However, finding a buyer for these is proving tricky. (583.5490) WISE Amsterdam – The sale of Bruce Power is the first stage in the breakup of the crisis-hit utility. British Energy (BE) would have gone bankrupt last year, except that the UK government just won’t allow it to go bankrupt. When liberalization of the UK wholesale electricity market led to falling prices, many generators faced a shortage of cash. BE was particularly hard-hit, since all but one of its power stations are nuclear, and so more expensive than natural gasfired power stations. The situation was made worse by technical problems at some of BE’s nuclear power stations (1). Citing concerns about nuclear safety and security of electricity supply, the UK government stepped in last year with a series of emergency loans (2). The current loan is 650 million pounds (over US$1 billion) and was set to expire on 9 March. However, the Bruce Power sale, plus “standstill ” agreements with “significant creditors ” were enough to persuade the UK government to extend its emergency loan, at a “reduced level”, beyond the 9 March deadline (3). Major BE creditors include BNFL, a state-owned corporation with financial problems of its own, and Enron, whose accounting scandal has made it a household name (4). Bruce sale Creditors must be pleased that BE has raised some cash by selling its stake in Bruce Power, which leases and operates Bruce nuclear generating station in Canada. BE was bought out by three companies. Cameco Corp, one of BE’s partners in Bruce Power, already owned a 15 % stake, but increased this to 31.6 % at a cost of C$209 million (US$137 million). However, not all of this is “new ” money, since the sale price includes part of a cash advance made to Bruce Power in late
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.008 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.010 | 0.004 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.008 | 0.005 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.006 | 0.010 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.078 | 0.030 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".