A Spoonful of Trust Helps the Nanotech Go Down
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Introduction Utopian and dystopian visions of nanotechnology are prominent in both the public press and academic literature. Proponents argue that nanotechnologies will help clean the environment, produce cheap energy and eliminate poverty, (1) while opponents respond that nanotechnologies will undermine local economies, raise serious health and safety issues, and possibly even destroy the environment. (2) It would be easy to reject out of hand these visions as extreme and irrelevant, because they do not represent the current or likely future states of the technology. However, this move side-steps the question of why these extreme visions arise, and more importantly, the problems that such polarized discussions create for public trust in government and science. As should be clear from recent experiences in Europe with genetically modified (GM) foods, it is no longer sufficient for governments, scientists and industry to deploy a technology that experts have deemed safe and effective--the general public must also buy the new technology if it is to be adopted. But this buy-in and public trust can be significantly undermined by the hyping of new technologies. In this paper, I argue that if governments, academic scientists and industry wish to effectively develop the potential of nanoscience and nanotechnologies, they must be cognizant of the dangers of over-hyping research and losing public trust. Hype Hype is arguably an important part of the opening phases in the development of a new technology, because it facilitates the creation of new networks of relations, helps in the acquisition of necessary resources (human, financial, technical), and permits the development of a popular consciousness about how the new technology will replace old, less effective ways of doing things. (3) By projecting an image of where a technology will lead, developers create a possible future that is fundamental to producing the incentives and obligations that will be necessary to mobilise the necessary resources for a particular aspiration to be realised. (4) To project the desired future image (and attract public or private research funding), scientists and universities will often, alongside more objective academic articles, make press releases and conduct media interviews that highlight the benefits and novelty of their research. The media in turn respond to broad public interest in science and technology by reporting on new discoveries. But while this reporting is usually factually accurate, it tends to be uncritical of scientific claims, focusing on the positive or novel aspects of the products of research while neglecting the limitations. (5) Although hype can be a very effective means of achieving these near term objectives, it can also be counterproductive in the long run. If we look at the case of GM crops and foods, for example, we see a set of technologies that were promised to be revolutionary (but safe), and that would quickly lead to enormous social, economic and environmental benefits. Governments (and industry) in the United States, Argentina, Canada and China have invested significant public monies in GM technologies (and implemented supportive agricultural and intellectual property rules) in the hope that these technologies will provide a competitive advantage for their large and heavily subsidized agricultural sectors. However, as with many other biotechnologies, such as gene therapy or pharmacogenetics, the promises have largely proven premature, the hype unsubstantiated, and for the most part the general public has yet to see any tangible benefits. (6) It should not then be surprising that many people are becoming sceptical of (and militant about challenging) the positive claims made by governments and industry about the safety and utility of GM foods and other biotechnologies. A culture of hype can also lead to weaker market conditions and skittish investors. As we saw in the late 1990s, the inability of most small biotechnology companies to make good on promises and translate intellectual property into marketable products led many venture capitalists to back away from this sector. …
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it