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Enregistrement W106247267

An Economic Assessment of Same-Sex Marriage Laws

2006· article· en· W106247267 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Douglas W. Allen

Notice bibliographique

RevueHarvard journal of law & public policy/Harvard journal of law and public policy · 2006
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueLegal Systems and Judicial Processes
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésIncentiveSanctionsInstitutionFamily lawContext (archaeology)SociologyLesbianLawLaw and economicsSocial psychologyPolitical scienceEconomicsPsychologyGender studies
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

This Article argues that marriage is an economically efficient institution, designed and evolved to regulate incentive problems that arise between a man and a woman over the life cycle of procreation. As such, its social and legal characteristics will provide a poor match for the incentive problems that arise in the two distinctly different relationships of gay and lesbian couples. Forcing all three relationships to be covered by the same law will lead to a sub-optimal law for all three types of marriage. I. INTRODUCTION is a word familiar to toddlers, and yet so complicated that most adults cannot articulate its real meaning. (1) Marriage is an institution. (2) It is a complex set of personal values, social norms, religious customs, and legal constraints that regulate a particular intimate human relation over a life span. (3) Families are organized around marriage, and marriage provides benefits to families in terms of survival and success. The source of these benefits springs from the incentives created by the rich fabric of characteristics laced throughout the formal and informal marital rules. Social norms on personal sacrifice within the context of marriage encourage husbands and wives to devote their lives and resources to each other and their children. Signaling, self-binding commitments, and third-party sanctions (to name a few) are part of the marriage incentives that encourage socially good behavior and punish socially bad behavior, which incentives are necessary because both husbands and wives often have private incentives at odds with the interests of the community and other family members. Marriage has never been a static, monolithic institution. Over time, the roles of men and women within marriage have changed. Social views on multiple wives, interracial relations, and divorce have changed. Legal rules regulating everything from the treatment of children and division of property to the grounds for divorce have changed. Yet certain elements of the institution of marriage have remained relatively constant for centuries. (4) For instance, marriage has always entailed more than a mere contract. Marriage involves not just a couple, but extended family members, non-blood relations, and impersonal third parties like the church, state, or tribe. Marriage has always required an intention for a life-long commitment. Marriage has always contained the expectation of fertility. Marriage has always been prohibited between siblings. Of course, until very recently, marriage was available only to heterosexual couples. (5) This Article argues that the best explanation for the evolution of some marriage characteristics while others do not change is that marriage is an institution uniquely equipped to handle incentive problems between a man and a woman over their full life cycle. (6) To some people, the idea of same-sex marriage is a fundamental departure from other marital changes, while for others, it is a natural extension of changes begun long ago. Thus, where same-sex marriage begins is a matter of debate. Some proponents go back to the Old Testament relationship of David and Jonathan. Others start with the Enlightenment concept of freedom of choice in spouse, and the radical idea of the pursuit of happiness in marriage. (7) Still others start with legal changes. Holland, followed by Belgium and Canada, became the first modern nation to legalize same-sex marriages at the turn of this century. (8) Other jurisdictions (including, for example, Scandinavian countries, Vermont, and California) have developed various types of registered civil unions that recognize and give partial marital rights to same-sex couples, and these often occurred before the current court decisions and legislation on same-sex marriage. (9) The ultimate political fate of same-sex marriage, what form it takes, and how it relates to traditional marriage are still undetermined issues. An enormous debate continues over the issue of same-sex marriage, even in countries where the basic premise has been accepted, like Canada, where the government passed formal legislation changing the legal definition of marriage in the summer of 2005. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction machine sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,005
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,021
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Observationnel · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: aucune
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,013
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,044

Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0050,021
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0010,001
Bibliométrie0,0030,002
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0020,004
Communication savante0,0060,005
Science ouverte0,0020,002
Intégrité de la recherche0,0020,003
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0130,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,024
Tête enseignante GPT0,331
Écart entre enseignants0,307 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeObservationnel
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations8
Publié2006
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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Même revueHarvard journal of law & public policy/Harvard journal of law and public policyMême sujetLegal Systems and Judicial ProcessesTravaux en français237 207