The Regulation of Nutrigenetic Testing: A Role for Civil Society Organisations?
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Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Introduction In March 2005, Pharmacogenetics Reporter ran a story describing how the nutrigenetic biotechnology company, Sciona, was moving its operations from the United Kingdom to the United States. (1) The report suggested that the move was largely motivated by the failure to create a consumer market for its testing services in the UK and the expectation that the US would provide a far more receptive market. In the UK, Sciona had been the subject of criticism from scientists, nutritionists, the Human Genetics Commission and civil society organisations (CSOs). The Sciona controversy sparked a review of the regulatory framework for consumer genetics in the UK. This paper uses the Sciona controversy and the resulting policy debate as a case study to discuss the role of CSOs in the regulation of commercial genetic testing services. As genomics research advances, the appropriate regulation of genetic testing becomes increasingly important. This issue has troubled clinicians, patient groups, policy makers and regulators for over ten years. In Canada, the US, Europe and Australia, high-level committees have considered the issue and made their recommendations in weighty reports. (2) Analysis of the policy issues requires an understanding of the concerns the regulation is supposed to address as well as the regulatory space, including the regulatory framework and the actors involved. Concerns raised regarding genetic testing can be broadly categorized as consumer harms and social costs. Consumer harms range from the fear of a 'new eugenics' based on discrimination and stigmatisation, to fears that tests of limited predictive value will mislead consumers, either providing false reassurance that they are genetically predisposed to good health or causing undue alarm and expanding the ranks of the 'worried well' relying on expensive and potentially harmful medications, diets or other interventions for questionable reasons. The potential social costs of genetic testing include a negative impact on the nation's health, if by focusing on genetic risks well-established environmental factors, such as exercise, diet, pollution and smoking, are neglected or minimized. In the case of tests marketed directly to the public, there is a fear that busy family doctors will be further burdened by patients who have been tested commercially and then seek either reassurance or action as a consequence of the test results, especially if the testing company has not provided adequate counselling or advice. The regulatory challenges include ensuring that consumers have full opportunity to give informed consent, assuring quality of lab procedures to promote accurate testing, policing promotional claims to halt misleading advertising, protecting privacy of genetic data, and requiring premarket review of tests to evaluate fitness for purpose (that is, can the test diagnose or predict disease with the accuracy that the test developer claims?). As a result of these concerns, a debate has developed about how best to regulate the practice of genetic testing to prevent harm and maximize benefits. The debate is fairly sophisticated in that a range of regulatory mechanisms are generally advanced--from statutory licensing and use of existing consumer protection law to voluntary codes of conduct, best practice guidelines and consumer education. Much of the debate has revolved around the relative importance of these different mechanisms. (3) To caricature, regulatory hardliners view a robust regulator as essential to good regulation--an entity with 'command and control' authority to oversee compliance. Conversely, regulatory libertarians posit industry self-regulation coupled with education of consumers and healthcare professionals as the crucial mechanisms. Regulatory Theory and the Role of CSOs The debate over regulation of genetic testing is underway when regulation itself is undergoing change. …
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Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle