A Comparison of the Evolution of Telecommunication Prices in Regulated and Unregulated Markets
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Since the liberalization of the telecommunications markets in the 90s, national regulators have focused on achieving a sufficient level of competition in the market. To this end, authorities have applied plenty of regulation with a focus on increasing the number of competitors and achieving constant reductions in prices. However, in some of these countries (like the USA), this kind of regulation has been abandoned, while in others, (like EU countries) is still applied. This objective is due to the regulatory model considered by authorities in their decisions, according to which the only benchmark for success is the price and what matters is the number of competitors and their market shares. This causes the authorities to identify improvement in social welfare with price reductions, regardless of other desirable considerations for the sustainability of markets. In consequence, most regulators, especially in the European Union, focus on the static efficiency of markets, ignoring their dynamic efficiency. It is widely believed that in less regulated markets there is more investment and innovation, but prices remain higher than in regulated markets. Meanwhile, economic theory states that in a non-regulated market, prices will tend to the minimum level allowing to recover the costs of providing services. Additionally, innovation will make those costs decline over time, and so, prices will tend to be lower, either in absolute terms or in relation to the utility of the services. The different regulatory situation in the USA and in the EU provides a good scenario in order to contrast those hypotheses, by comparing the evolution of prices in both markets. It is generally recognized that the telecommunication market is heavily regulated in European countries, whereas it is relatively unregulated in U.S. In this paper, we will make an empirical analysis of the evolution of prices of telecommunications services. We will study the evolution of prices in some markets of developed countries with different levels of regulations, in order to verify if regulated countries have enjoyed larger price reductions than countries with lower regulation, and what, if any, are the consequences in terms of innovation and investment. We will analyze different EU countries, together with Canada, the United States, Japan, South Korea and Singapore. We will review a set of parameters for a period of 10 / 15 years, including prices, population, customers, regulation and investment. We intend to use the Customer Price Index for telecommunications services to measure the evolution of prices, the Regulatory Density Index by Polynomics AG to measure the intensity of regulation, and data from the World Bank, the ITU and other public sources to represent the rest of parameters. Our preliminary findings suggest that the evolution of prices has been similar in lightly regulated markets like the US or Korea than in heavily regulated ones like the EU or Japan.
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Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,008 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,002 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Communication savante | 0,003 | 0,002 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,003 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».