MétaCan
Menu
Retour à la cohorte
Enregistrement W142522410

The Northern America Fertility Divide

2005· article· en· W142522410 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Barbara Boyle Torrey, Nicholas Eberstadt

Notice bibliographique

RevuePolicy review · 2005
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueInsurance, Mortality, Demography, Risk Management
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésImmigrationPopulationFertilityGeographyGovernment (linguistics)Total fertility rateDevelopment economicsPolitical scienceDemographic economicsEconomic growthDemographyEconomicsSociologyFamily planningLaw
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

CANADA AND THE U.S. are more similar to each other than any two other large countries on the planet today. We share a language, a continent, and a colonial history. Our two affluent and resource-rich countries, moreover, have forged the largest trading bond in the modern world. (1) Since the implementation of NAFTA in 1993, of course, the volume of U.S.-Canadian trade has steadily increased; this economic integration is drawing the two economies ever closer. Yet for all their similarities--and the unfolding forces pressing for still greater homogenization--Canada and the United States are remarkably distinct from one another. In recent years, government policies in these two similar countries have diverged recurrently, and conspicuously, on a number of issues: Think of Iraq, missile defense, lumber, gay marriage, and marijuana. And these highly visible differences may not be the biggest ones. A quiet and as yet largely unrecognized divergence may be even more fundamental. Its indicators are found in the relatively new but steadily increasing differentiation of demographic trends in North America. Twenty-five years ago the population profiles of Canada and the United States were similar. Both were younger than their European allies, and their societies were more heterogeneous. In 1980 their populations had almost the same median age, fertility rates, and immigration rates. In the years since then, small changes in demographic variables have accumulated, ultimately creating two very different countries in North America by the end of the twentieth century. Canadians now have half a child fewer than Americans during their life-times--their fertility level is roughly 25 percent lower than that of their neighbors south of the border--and they are living two years longer. Both populations are growing at about the same rate, but the components of growth have diverged. Immigration is relatively more important in Canada's growth rate, and fertility is more important in the United States. Canadians marry later and less often than Americans. They enter common-law unions more often and their children are increasingly likely to be born out of wedlock. Canadians and Americans have similar labor force participation rates, but Americans work more hours per year. They have higher incomes but less leisure. And even though Canada's birth rate is now substantially lower than America's, the Canadian government provides more child services and benefits than the U.S. government. Changes in patterns of marriage and fertility are the accumulated outcomes of millions of personal decisions by men and women. When couples, one at a time, make decisions that differ in aggregate from the couples in a neighboring country, it is a reflection of deliberate agency rather than mere chance. That's why the still-widening demographic gap that has opened up between Canada and the U.S. says even more about the two societies and their futures than public or policy differences on any single issue. It also demonstrates that macroeconomic integration since NAFTA may not have had a homogenizing effect at a household level. This exploration should make Canadians who fear becoming too much like the U.S. a bit less fearful. Why fertility may change ONE OF THE most important and interesting debates in demography today centers on the decline in fertility in developed countries. When the decline in total fertility rates begins and when it stops is of importance not only to demographers, but also to societies. Age structure changes that are caused by declining fertility have far-reaching ripple effects: They touch on all age-specific activities and programs throughout society. Over the past generation, childbearing patterns in nearly all developed countries have changed significantly, falling to levels that (if continued indefinitely in the absence of immigration) would presage a steady shrinking of successive generations. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,002
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesCharge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Autre devis · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Synthèse · Signal consensuel: aucune
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,962
Score d'incertitude au seuil1,000

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0020,001
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,001
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0010,000
Communication savante0,0000,000
Science ouverte0,0010,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,000
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0000,001

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,028
Tête enseignante GPT0,367
Écart entre enseignants0,339 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Devis d'étudeAutre devis
Domainenon disponible
GenreSynthèse

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations3
Publié2005
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

Explorer davantage

Même revuePolicy reviewMême sujetInsurance, Mortality, Demography, Risk ManagementTravaux en français237 207