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Enregistrement W154803225

Effects of Property Taxes and Development Charges on Urban Development: Perspectives of Planners, Developers, and Finance Officers in Toronto and Ottawa

2000· article· en· W154803225 sur OpenAlexvenueaboutno aff
Andrejs Skaburskis, Ray Tomalty

Notice bibliographique

RevueCanadian Journal of Regional Science · 2000
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
ThématiqueFiscal Policy and Economic Growth
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésGrowth managementProfitability indexSmart growthBusinessProperty taxLand useUrban planningEconomicsEnvironmental planningFinanceRevenueGeographyEngineeringCivil engineering
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

City and regional planners in North America tend to agree that fostering growth is no longer their prime objective and that the peripheral expansion of cities creates a host of problems. The countryside is made beyond reach much of the time. Congestion increases, as does pollution. Services cost more. Repetitive, garage-faced streets push without end through old orchards, farmland, forests and meadows. Growth management plans have been developed in many of the coastal areas of the United States to keep uncontrolled development from killing the golden goose that brings the demand for more buildings. Many of the plans try to manage growth by directly affecting the development process by insisting on concurrent and inter-jurisdictionally consistent infrastructure expansion. More direct instruments include growth boundaries and development caps. Relatively little has been said in the growth management literature of the efficacy of using fiscal instruments to change the profitability of different types of development and, thereby, influence the way a region develops. This article discusses the prospects for using property taxes and development cost charges to affect urban development. Property taxes and development cost charges can have environmental impacts by changing the extent to which developers substitute land for buildings and, thereby, the density of the built form, the spread of cities, and the mix of land uses. The schedules of rates and fees can promote city spread directly by favouring less dense projects. Fiscal instruments can have indirect effects by changing the optimal timing of development that affects the conditions under which it takes place and therefore the density with which land is developed. The reliance on property taxes and development cost charges to finance local services may induce municipal officials to encourage developers of the low density projects that are thought, perhaps erroneously, to yield the greatest fiscal dividends. The substitution, timing and fiscalisation consequences of property taxes and development cost charges are examined through interviews with Toronto and Ottawa area developers, municipal planners and finance officers. The article starts by describing the two financial instruments as they are used in Ontario. The expected consequences of the two instruments are presented next. The survey and interview methods are described, the context is set, and the findings and conclusions follow. Fiscal Instrument and Urban Form The Shift Toward Development Cost Charges The history of development charges and property taxes are closely intertwined in Ontario, as revealed by the development of municipal infrastructure financing mechanisms over the 20th century. The Ontario Local Improvement Act of 1914 allowed municipalities to install growth-related services and recover the costs by levying local improvement taxes on the property owners who benefited from the service provision. Tax rates were negotiated on a site-specific basis, based on the principle that developers should pay in proportion to the benefits received. Although the taxes were structured to cover the full cost of local improvements, when developers failed financially, the costs were transferred to municipal taxpayers. In difficult times, this system threatened to bankrupt many of Ontario's financially strapped municipalities (Steele 1956). In the 1950s, growth-pressured municipalities began to transfer the risk of on-site infrastructure financing to developers by requiring them to install roads, sewer and water facilities internal to their subdivisions as a condition of development approval. After being challenged by developers in the 1950s, the legality of this practice was established by revisions to the Planning Act in 1959. By the 1960s, most municipalities in Ontario were using subdivision agreements for this purpose. Off-site services (i.e., investments that could not be linked directly to individual developments) were originally paid for through municipal bonds supported by general municipal revenues such as property taxes. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction machine sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,001
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,004
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Qualitatif · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: Empirique
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,127
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,920

Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0010,004
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,001
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,001
Bibliométrie0,0010,003
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0100,009
Communication savante0,0070,002
Science ouverte0,0010,002
Intégrité de la recherche0,0010,002
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0060,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,014
Tête enseignante GPT0,191
Écart entre enseignants0,177 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeQualitatif
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations8
Publié2000
Routes d'admission2
Résumé présentoui

Explorer davantage

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